Wittgenstein, la definicion ostensiva y los limites del lenguaje

Acero, Juan José (1999) Wittgenstein, la definicion ostensiva y los limites del lenguaje. Teorema, XVIII (2). pp. 5-17.

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It has been argued that in his Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein gave a picture of ostensive definitions according to which there are no relations between language and reality, i.e., between the concepts we think with and those things they represent. Were such a picture accurate, there would be no hope of getting an objective view over our conceptual scheme. In the present paper I examine Wittgenstein's remarks on ostensive definitions and conclude that attributing that view to him is a mistake. A more balanced interpretation suggests that he did nothing to convince his readers that the relations between language and reality are illusory. On the contrary, his main aim was to undermine a naive understanding of how those relations are set up.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Epistemology; Illusion; Language; Ostensive-Definition; Reality-
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Teorema. Revista internacional de filosofia > Volume XVIII (1999)
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Sprachphilosophie
Depositing User: Wolfgang Heuer
Date Deposited: 06 Dec 2020 13:58
Last Modified: 06 Dec 2020 13:59
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/2761

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