Natural Kinds and the Identity of Property

Hong, Chang Seong (1998) Natural Kinds and the Identity of Property. Teorema, XVII (1). pp. 89-98.

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Kripke's argument for the rigid designation of natural kind terms is fallacious because he does not distinguish natural kinds from second-order functional properties; by clarifying the concepts of natural kind and functional property, we can show that natural kind terms do designate their referents rigidly, but that functional property terms are not rigid designators. My discussions of functional property will also help dispel the worry about the alleged cases of contingent identity with regard to theoretical statements in science. There is no contingent identity even in the form of second-order logic: Property identity is also a necessary identity. The principle of necessary identity rules relentlessly.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Identity; Kind; Metaphysics; Natural; Property; Reference; Rigid-Designation; Kripke S.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Teorema. Revista internacional de filosofia > Volume XVII (1998)
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Logik, analytische Philosophie
Depositing User: Wolfgang Heuer
Date Deposited: 06 Dec 2020 14:02
Last Modified: 06 Dec 2020 14:03

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