Las distinciones modales de Kripke y el concepto de proposicion

Perez Otero, Manuel (1998) Las distinciones modales de Kripke y el concepto de proposicion. Teorema, XVII (1). pp. 61-74.

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I analyze here some insights of Naming and Necessity that have become especially influential in the subsequent philosophy of language and metaphysics. Kripke's distinction between necessary truth and a priori truth plays a central role in two respects: it is fundamental to understand how essentialism has received support from Kripke's book; and it can be seen as closely related to another distinction between two independently plausible but confronted conceptions about what is the proposition expressed by a sentence.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Language; Name; Necessity; Proposition; Truth; Kripke S.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Teorema. Revista internacional de filosofia > Volume XVII (1998)
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Logik, analytische Philosophie
Depositing User: Wolfgang Heuer
Date Deposited: 06 Dec 2020 14:03
Last Modified: 06 Dec 2020 14:03

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