Los nombres y la referencia: semantica y metasemantica

Stalnaker, Robert (1998) Los nombres y la referencia: semantica y metasemantica. Teorema, XVII (1). pp. 7-19.

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Kripke, in "Naming and Necessity", defended answers to two kinds of questions about names and reference: a Millian semantics that answers a question of descriptive semantics and a causal account of reference that answers a metasemantic question--a question about what makes a descriptive semantic theory correct. It is argued that the main philosophical work in Kripke's defense of his account of names and reference is done by distinguishing the questions of clarifying the alternative possible answers to them in a way that provides a rebuttal to philosophical arguments that a Millian semantics is impossible.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Language; Meaning; Name; Reference; Semantics; Kripke S.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Teorema. Revista internacional de filosofia > Volume XVII (1998)
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Logik, analytische Philosophie
Depositing User: Wolfgang Heuer
Date Deposited: 06 Dec 2020 14:03
Last Modified: 06 Dec 2020 14:03
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/2790

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