Rigidity and De Jure Rigidity

Textor, Mark (1998) Rigidity and De Jure Rigidity. Teorema, XVII (1). pp. 45-59.

[thumbnail of TEXTOR.pdf] PDF

Download (208kB)


Most discussions of Kripke's Naming and Necessity focus either on Kripke's so-called "historical theory of reference" or his thesis that names are rigid designators. But in response to problems of the rigidity thesis Kripke later points out that his thesis about proper names is a stronger one: proper names are de jure rigid. This sets the agenda for my paper. Certain problems raised for Kripke's view show that the notion of de jure rigidity is in need of clarification. I will try to clarify the notion of de jure rigidity by analyzing characterizations of it given in the literature. I will argue in particular that Kripke can count descriptive names as de jure rigid and that the concept of de jure rigidity should not be explained with recourse to the concept of a semantical rule. The second part of the paper is a critical discussion of arguments intended to show that proper names are not de jure rigid. I will show that these arguments are unconvincing by using Dummett's distinction between assertoric content and ingredient sense.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Language; Meaning; Name; Necessity; Reference; Kripke, S.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Teorema. Revista internacional de filosofia > Volume XVII (1998)
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Logik, analytische Philosophie
Depositing User: Wolfgang Heuer
Date Deposited: 06 Dec 2020 14:03
Last Modified: 06 Dec 2020 14:03
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/2791

Actions (login required)

View Item
View Item