On the Interpretability of Rules

Saul Krikpe"s skeptical argument and skeptical
solution concerning rule-following are quite well known (cf.
Kripke 1982). As an interpretation of Wittgenstein"s view, it
seems to has a basis in Wittgenstein"s writings such as the
following remarks: "And how can it [a rule] guide us, when
its expression can after all be interpreted by us both thus
and otherwise? I.e. when all various regularities
correspond to it� (Wittgenstein 1978, 347) It is in the spirit
of such a passage that Kripke starts his own unusual
reading of Wittgenstein"s views on rule-following. In
particular he considers the case that in teaching a rule
such as "addition" to a person, the number of examples
actually shown is finite. Various rules would be compatible
with such a finite number of examples. So there seems to
be no reason to insist that the teacher teaches, or the pupil
learns, a particular rule rather than any of the other
possible rules. Against this, one may want to cite a fact
which can be used to single out one particular regularity.
But Kripke goes on to show that various possible
candidates that may constitute such a fact are all wanting.
Thus he concludes that there is no matter of the fact as to
what an expression or rule means, a dire consequence
that seems to obliterate meaning and even mental
contents, his skeptical solution in terms of communal
agreement notwithstanding.