Fuller, Gary (2002) Mental Simulation: the Old-Fashioned Dispute. In: UNSPECIFIED Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, pp. 59-61.
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
We attribute psychological states and intentional
actions to others. We also predict such states and actions
and explain them. I attribute to Fred the belief that that
mountain in the distance is the Schneeberg as well as the
thought that it would be pleasant to climb it. I predict that
later in the week when there is some free time Fred will
form the intention to climb the mountain that very
afternoon. And when one morning later in the week Fred
says, "Let"s drive to Puchberg [at the foot of the
Schneeberg] this afternoon,� I have no problem explaining
what is up: Fred has Schneeberg plans. Further, we often
do this spontaneously, effortlessly, and, in the majority of
cases, successfully.
Item Type: | Book Section |
---|---|
Uncontrolled Keywords: | psychological states; intentional action; theory of mind theory(TT); simulation theory(ST); |
Subjects: | Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Bewußtseinsphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes und der Psychologie Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2002 |
Depositing User: | Users 387 not found. |
Date Deposited: | 06 Dec 2020 14:14 |
Last Modified: | 06 Dec 2020 14:14 |
URI: | http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/2864 |