Gendler on Why We Can't Trust Thought Experiments on Personal Identity

Kanuck, Kathryn (2002) Gendler on Why We Can't Trust Thought Experiments on Personal Identity. In: UNSPECIFIED Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, pp. 100-102.

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In "Exceptional Persons," Tamar Gendler argues
that we cannot make reliable judgments about imaginary
cases because the conceptually necessary and sufficient
conditions for application of the concept of personal
identity (sameness of person) don"t guide our application in
everyday cases, and while acceptable in actual cases, this
leads to error in considering hypothetical cases. In this
paper, I explain Gendler's argument against the utility of
thought experiments on personal identity and argue that
the central case she uses to illustrate the problem is

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: Personal Identity; Gendler T.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2002
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Anthropologie
Depositing User: Wolfgang Heuer
Date Deposited: 06 Dec 2020 14:17
Last Modified: 06 Dec 2020 14:17

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