A Dilemma for Personal Identity

Kügler, Peter (2002) A Dilemma for Personal Identity. In: UNSPECIFIED Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, pp. 124-126.

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Some theories of personal identity allow persons
to lose their identities in processes of qualitative change,
i.e., to become a numerically different person by getting
new physical and/or psychological properties. I shall call
these theories strong. Weak theories, in contrast, do not
allow for such a loss of identity. In general, weak theories
put less restrictions on personal identity than strong ones. I
will argue that each type of theory faces a serious problem.

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: person-theories, strong theory, weak theory; Memory; Intention; Persistence; Causality
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Bewußtseinsphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes und der Psychologie
Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2002
Depositing User: Wolfgang Heuer
Date Deposited: 06 Dec 2020 14:20
Last Modified: 06 Dec 2020 14:20
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/2900

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