Cartesian Minds

Levin, Yakir (2002) Cartesian Minds. In: UNSPECIFIED Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, pp. 133-135.

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According to a basic dualistic conception that
originated in Descartes, minds are immaterial, non-spatial
and simple thinking particulars that are independent of
anything material. Call this view the Cartesian conception,
and minds thus conceived, Cartesian minds. In what
follows I propose a new version of an argument against the
Cartesian conception that can be traced back to
Descartes" days (Garber and Ayers 1998, 232). The
inspiration behind my version is an argument suggested by
Strawson"s seminal discussion of the concept of a person
(1959, Chaps. 3-4). However, in both form and substance
my argument takes its own course.

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: Dualism; Mind; Realism; Nominalism; Descartes R.; Goodman N.; Strawson P.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Bewußtseinsphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes und der Psychologie
Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2002
Depositing User: Wolfgang Heuer
Date Deposited: 06 Dec 2020 14:22
Last Modified: 06 Dec 2020 14:22

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