Is the Private Language Argument a Transcendental Argument?

Comparisons between Kant´s critique of pure
reason and Wittgenstein´s critique of language, which
became current in analytic philosophy (Cf. e.g Hacker
1972, 30.) seem not far-fetched in view of the impetus for
the destruction of dogmatic metaphysics both philosophers
share. Their relevance would gain though by an
elaboration of their dissimilarities rather than by just
stressing similarities.
An example of the former approach, Weinert
(1983, 412) contrasts the tools both critics of metaphysics
employ: the distinction between analytic and synthetic
judgments, and the description of the logic of languageuse
and in particular the ´Argument from Epistemic
Operators´ (Wittgenstein 1961, sects. 6.5, 6.51; 1958, §§
246, 247, 251, 303; references in the form of paragraphnumbers
are to the latter text) respectively. The analysis of
the employment of those tools in anti-metaphysical
arguments -and Weinert treats the Private Language
Argument (PLA) as such (427-429)- enables to uncover
underlying assumptions, e.g. the implicit assumption in
Kant of a prior conceptual relation between concepts to
which his notion of analysis is to be applied (430-431) and
Wittgenstein´s explicit doctrine that "ordinary language is
alright� (434).