Language Idling and Language in Use Wittgenstein on Following Rules

This paper has a simple goal: it aims to present
the difference between static logic and dynamic grammar.
At the same time I will stress another difference which
traverses logic and grammar: the difference between
language idling and language in use. There is a
development from static logic to dynamic grammar in
Wittgenstein"s philosophy from early to late, whereas the
difference between language idling and language in use
pervades the whole oeuvre. Therefore I shall distinguish
between four different conditions pertaining to the attempt
to render the relations that hold language together. We find
in early Wittgenstein "idle static logic" and "static logic in
use," and in late Wittgenstein "idle dynamic grammar" and
"dynamic grammar in use." This four-fold distinction serves
to emphasize that the crucial shift to "use," which is usually
claimed to be a feature of the Philosophical Investigations,
already takes place in the Tractatus. A negligence of this
"double shift" from logic to grammar and from idle language
to language in use brought about a vast amount of
misapprehensions of Wittgenstein"s philosophy, especially
of the account of rule following.