Understanding Everyday Mental Concepts: Theory or Simulation?

Röska-Hardy, Lousie (2002) Understanding Everyday Mental Concepts: Theory or Simulation? In: UNSPECIFIED Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, pp. 208-210.

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In the course of explaining and anticipating thought
and action, we characterize both ourselves and others in
mental terms, e.g. as "believing the bus departs at ten" or
"wanting to go swimming". The ability to characterize
oneself and others in such terms is central to
understanding persons. It underwrites the self-attribution of
beliefs, desires, emotions and other conscious, occurrent
"mental states" (MS) and subserves MS-attribution to
others. How do ordinary people understand the contents of
mental state concepts like belief or desire? Philosophers of
mind and cognitive scientists have put forward answers
based on theory-theory (TT), modularity theory (MT) and
simulation theory (ST). Before examining how these
approaches explain the contents of MS-concepts, two
widespread assumptions concerning everyday
psychological attributions should be discussed.

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: Theory Theory(TT); Modular Theory(MT); Simulation Theory(ST); MEntal States Concept (MS); Strawson P.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Bewußtseinsphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes und der Psychologie
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Ontologie
Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2002
Depositing User: Wolfgang Heuer
Date Deposited: 06 Dec 2020 14:26
Last Modified: 06 Dec 2020 14:26
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/2937

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