The Scenery of Knowledge"s Language-Game in Wittgenstein"s Philosophical Investigations

Our purpose is to take into account Wittgenstein"s
analyses about knowledge in the Philosophical Investigations,
in order to articulate them and elaborate a concept
of knowledge (Wissen). My first claim is that this is
possible. My second claim is that the complexity of this
concept has not been taken into consideration and its
originality has been misunderstood in the horizon of the
Philosophy of Mind (Vohra, A. 1986), of Philosophy of
Psychology (Schulte, J. 1993; Budd, M. 1989). My
objection is that the analysis of "knowledge� presupposes
the dissolution of mind and psychology. My third claim
concerns the interpretation of the verb "to know� from K.
Bühler"s point of view as a kind of signal (Signal), at least
in some uses, and as a symbol or an expression in some
others. This connection concerning "knowledge� has not
been brought out in, e.g., (Hacker, P.M.S. 1993; von
Savigny, E. and Scholz, O.R. 1995).