Peirce and Wittgenstein on Doubt: A Comparison

There are many areas of Peirce and Wittgenstein"s thought
which have great affinity for one another such as: the
impossibility of a private language, the distinction between
believing and knowing, and the role of doubt and certainty
in our epistemic practices. I shall focus on the affinity
between Peirce and Wittgenstein"s thought on the role of
doubt in our epistemic practices. I will argue that Peirce
and Wittgenstein give us a "broadly" pragmatic account of
the role of doubt and by this I mean, they are interested in
the difference doubt makes to our epistemic practices (I do
not mean by this that Wittgenstein is part of a philosophical
movement called pragmatism). Specifically, Peirce and
Wittgenstein argue against the skeptical, or Cartesian,
form of doubt that has dominated epistemological discussion.
They deny that universal doubt is a genuine doubt;
such a "doubt" is idle, because it does not have any practical
consequences for us. Genuine doubt must have a
ground and of course there is no rule that can determine
whether a ground for doubt is genuine in all circumstances.
Doubts occur in a context, with all our prejudices and
beliefs in place.