Is Explaining Intuition Compatible with Trusting it?

Miš�evi�, Nenad (2003) Is Explaining Intuition Compatible with Trusting it? In: Pre-Proceedings of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Kirchberg am Wechsel, pp. 242-244.

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First, a summary of anti-naturalist criticism of explanationism,
taking Th. Nagel"s work (1997) as typical. A common
assumption in the debate is the following one: if there
is a causal explanation of our intuitions, it will appeal to the
design of our mind, and ultimately to the causal-historical
forces shaping it. In other words, the thinkers find their
intuitions immediately compelling because they, the intuitions,
reflect the built-up of thinker"s minds. The intuitioncontents,
on the other hand, tend to be true, since the
built-up of the mind reflects the most general structures of
reality that has been causally shaping it. Most explanationists
offer the design account as the best available
explanation-sketch. The anti-explanationists, from Kant
(Critique of Pure reason, B 176) through Wittgensteinians
(e.g., J: Lear) to Th. Nagel (1997), G. Bealer (1987) and J.
Pust (2001), perform a modus tollens on this designfocused
account. Since it is self-undermining and has unacceptable
normative conesquences it should be rejected,
they claim. Here is Nagel"s recent formulation of the use of
evolutionary hypothesis about the origin of our minddesign.

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: Intuition; Anti-Naturalistic Criticism; Causal Explanation; Kant, I.; Nagel, T;
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Epistemologie, Wissenschaftstheorie, Naturphilosophie
Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2003
Depositing User: Wolfgang Heuer
Date Deposited: 06 Dec 2020 14:51
Last Modified: 06 Dec 2020 14:52

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