Ohmacht, Martin
(2003)
*WittgensteinÂ´s Critique of GödelÂ´s Incompleteness Results.*
In:
Pre-Proceedings of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium.
Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Kirchberg am Wechsel, pp. 269-271.

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## Abstract

It is often said that GödelÂ´s famous theorem of 1931 is

equal to the Cretian Liar, who says that everything that he

says is a lie. But GödelÂ´s result is only similar to this

sophism and not equivalent to it. When mathematicians

deal with GödelÂ´s theorem, then it is often the case that

they become poetical or even emotional: some of them

show a high esteem of it and others despise it. Wittgenstein

sees the famous Liar as a useless language game

which doesnÂ´t excite anybody. GödelÂ´s first incompleteness

theorem shows us that in mathematics there are

puzzles which have no solution at all and therefore in

mathematics one should be very careful when one

chooses a puzzle on which one wants to work. GödelÂ´s

second imcompleteness theorem deals with hidden

contradictions â€“ Wittgenstein shows a paradigmatic

solution: he simply shrugs his shoulders on this problem

and many mathematicians do so today as well. Wittgenstein

says than GödelÂ´s results should not be treated as

mathematical theorems, but as elements of the humanistic

sciences. Wittgenstein sees them as something which

should be worked on in a creative manner.

Item Type: | Book Section |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | Incompleteness Theorem; common sense philosophy; LiarÂ´s Paradox; Goedel, A.; Wittgenstein, L. |

Subjects: | Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2003 Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Logik, analytische Philosophie Philosophie > Geschichte der Philosophie > g) 20.Jahrhundert |

Depositing User: | Wolfgang Heuer |

Date Deposited: | 06 Dec 2020 14:53 |

Last Modified: | 06 Dec 2020 14:53 |

URI: | http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/3109 |