Bayes" and Fisher"s Conceptions of Statistic in the Context of Empirical Paradigm

Reznikov, Vladimir (2003) Bayes" and Fisher"s Conceptions of Statistic in the Context of Empirical Paradigm. In: Pre-Proceedings of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Kirchberg am Wechsel, pp. 292-294.

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The conceptions of Bayes and Neyman-Pearson are
considered in methodological literature as irreconcilable
opponents as for their goals, tasks, and methods of solving
statistical problems [1-3]. This article demonstrates that in
some respects important for the statistical practice the
methodological principles of the conceptions of Bayes (BC)
and Fisher (FC), the last is ideologically close to Neyman-
Pearson, reveal the similarity in positions. As an alternative
to these directions of investigations an empirical conception
is proposed. Let us start with some critical arguments
against Bayes and Fisher's conceptions.

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: Bayesian paradigm; Fisher's paradigm; law of large numbers
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2003
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Logik, analytische Philosophie
Depositing User: Wolfgang Heuer
Date Deposited: 06 Dec 2020 14:54
Last Modified: 06 Dec 2020 14:54

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