Judgement and Certainty

van der Schaar, Maria (2003) Judgement and Certainty. In: Pre-Proceedings of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Kirchberg am Wechsel, pp. 311-313.

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Judgement is the interiorisation of assertion: the inner
notion of judgement is to be explained in terms of the outer
notion of assertion. When someone asserts "Snow is
white", an interlocutor is entitled to ask "How do you know?"
If the asserter is not able to give grounds for his assertion,
it has to be withdrawn. In an assertion an illocutionary
claim that one has grounds is present; an assertion is thus
a claim to knowledge. Not all occurrences of declarative
sentences are asserted. In such cases the context should
make it clear that the declarative is, for example, used to
express mere opinion or conjecture. Whereas an assertion
made is correct or incorrect, other uses of the declarative
do not allow for this distinction. Just as for assertion, implicit
in every judgement is a claim to knowledge; judgement
is an epistemic notion.

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: Certainty; Non-Epistemic Certainty; Wittgenstein, L.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Epistemologie, Wissenschaftstheorie, Naturphilosophie
Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2003
Depositing User: Wolfgang Heuer
Date Deposited: 06 Dec 2020 14:55
Last Modified: 06 Dec 2020 14:55
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/3123

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