What does Haack"s double-aspect experientialism give us?

Talmont-Kaminski, Konrad (2003) What does Haack"s double-aspect experientialism give us? In: Pre-Proceedings of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Kirchberg am Wechsel, pp. 342-344.

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Twentieth century analytical epistemology concerned itself
mainly with various attempts to work out two basic issues.
The issue most often engaged was the relationship
between beliefs, propositions, theories and such other
elements of a world view that had been thought of as
deserving of being called "knowledge". The other issue that
was often considered was the relationship between the
abovementioned elements and experiences. This issue
was of manifest significance given the empiricist roots of
most of the analytic tradition and became even more vital
once Quine"s critique seemed to rule out a priori knowledge
and gave rise to the naturalist tradition (Quine 1953).
The middle of the century didn"t just witness Quine"s
undermining of the a priori. At much the same time, Sellars
attacked the idea of The Given and seemed to remove the
possibility of experience being involved in the justification
of our beliefs (Sellars 1963). The two arguments taken
together have given rise to a number of epistemologically
nihilist positions – most clearly to Rorty"s anti-realist neopragmatism
(Rorty 1979).

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: The Myth of the Given; Normative naturalism; Sellars, W.; Haack, S.; Davidson, D.; Quine, W.v.O.; Popper, K.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2003
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Logik, analytische Philosophie
Depositing User: Wolfgang Heuer
Date Deposited: 06 Dec 2020 15:02
Last Modified: 06 Dec 2020 15:02
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/3177

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