Wittgenstein and the Internalism-Externalism Dilemma

Witek, Maciej (2003) Wittgenstein and the Internalism-Externalism Dilemma. In: Pre-Proceedings of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Kirchberg am Wechsel, pp. 374-376.

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It can be said that Wittgenstein"s Private Language Argument
initiated the internalism-externalism dilemma. In one
of its interpretations the argument is read as a criticism of
methodological solipsism. Internalism, in turn, assumes
that methodological solipsism is an adequate account of
mental content. Therefore some externalists refer to
Wittgenstein as their forerunner.
I argue, first, that the Private Language Argument does
not support the claim of externalism that meanings are not
in the head, even though it undermines methodological
solipsism. I also claim that both internalism and externalism
are not free from serious problems. Therefore we need
a view that goes beyond the distinction in hand. To arrive
at such a view I examine John Searle"s account of mental
content and argue that the real tension within the theory of
content is between the first-person and the third-person
point of view.

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: Internalism-Externalism; Metal content; Mental states; Searl, J.; Putnam, H.; Wittgenstein, L.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Bewußtseinsphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes und der Psychologie
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Epistemologie, Wissenschaftstheorie, Naturphilosophie
Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2003
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Sprachphilosophie
Depositing User: Wolfgang Heuer
Date Deposited: 06 Dec 2020 15:04
Last Modified: 06 Dec 2020 15:04
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/3188

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