Wittgenstein and the Internalism-Externalism Dilemma

It can be said that Wittgenstein"s Private Language Argument
initiated the internalism-externalism dilemma. In one
of its interpretations the argument is read as a criticism of
methodological solipsism. Internalism, in turn, assumes
that methodological solipsism is an adequate account of
mental content. Therefore some externalists refer to
Wittgenstein as their forerunner.
I argue, first, that the Private Language Argument does
not support the claim of externalism that meanings are not
in the head, even though it undermines methodological
solipsism. I also claim that both internalism and externalism
are not free from serious problems. Therefore we need
a view that goes beyond the distinction in hand. To arrive
at such a view I examine John Searle"s account of mental
content and argue that the real tension within the theory of
content is between the first-person and the third-person
point of view.