Autoconciencia y agencia epistémica en Kant y P. F. Strawson

Gutiérrez, Pedro Stepanenko (2004) Autoconciencia y agencia epistémica en Kant y P. F. Strawson. Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía, 23 (1-3). pp. 5-16. ISSN 0210-1602

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In this paper I show that P. F. Strawson’s interpretation of the concept of selfconsciousness in Kant’s theoretical philosophy leaves out one of its basic features, namely, that the subject of self-consciousness is an epistemic agent, and not only a subject of self-ascription. Additionally, I argue that Strawson’s failure to appreciate
this aspect of self-consciousness in The Bounds of Sense is motivated, on the one hand, by his rejection of Kant’s theory of synthesis, and, on the other, by his failure to
appreciate the relevant differences between transcendental self-consciousness and inner sense.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Teorema. Revista internacional de filosofia > Volume XXIII (2004)
Depositing User: sandra subito
Date Deposited: 06 Dec 2020 16:01
Last Modified: 06 Dec 2020 16:01

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