On Mutual Recognition. Hegel versus Habermas and Apel.

Abstract:
This paper aims at clarifying the similarities and differences between Hegel and Habermas/Apel in relation to the topic of mutual recognition. Hegel's dialectic of master and slave in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* forms the point of departure. This version of Hegel's dialectic of recognition will be compared to Habermas' and Apel's discourse ethics. Habermas'/Apel's linguistic and communicative turn represents one of the main differences in this regard, and will be compared to the abstractive type of recognition that is to be found in Hegel's *Phenomenology* version of this topic. The idea of mutual recognition is, nevertheless, at hand in both positions, and worth taking a closer look at.

Hegel's master-slave dialectic

Central to Hegel's master-slave dialectic in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*[1] stands the idea that mutual recognition works as a necessary condition for the freedom of the individual. One-sided recognition of the freedom of the other is therefore not sufficient, since the individuals need to recognize each other as free individuals at a mutual basis in order to acquire freedom themselves. This idea of mutuality, in fact, is also central to other, liberal philosophers of the 1900th century, such as John Stuart Mill:

> The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it. (Mill 1985 [1859], 72)

Hegel's master-slave dialectic is very useful in this respect, since it also contains a social type of conflict that makes it easier to see the idea of mutual recognition in relation to material (socio-economic) conditions. The

---

[1] Henceforth, I will make use of the abbreviation *Phenomenology*.

Phenomenology-version of this dialectic, however, is also one of the most abstractive ones within his authorship, and the master-slave dialectic as such bears no clear indications of which era it belongs to. In spite of its abstractive character, it does present the conditions of individual freedom in a clear cut manner. I will, therefore, briefly recapitulate the basic tenets of this master-slave dialectic before I turn to its function in relation to possible socio-economic contexts, both in relation to its generic background as well as contexts of application.

The *Phenomenology*-chapter of *Self-Consciousness* takes its departure in the relationship between the individual (the 'consciousness' in Hegel's terms) and nature. This relationship forms the basis of the consciousness' awareness of itself as a self-consciousness, since it is only in relation to an other that the consciousness can gain awareness of itself. This relationship, however, is also seen as an one-sided one: 'nature' is neither capable of gaining consciousness about itself nor its 'other'. Only in relation to another consciousness will the self-consciousness be able to acquire a relationship based on mutuality.

The relationship between the two self-consciousnesses is at first a relationship based on struggle. The self-consciousness tries to win its freedom through the suppression of an other self-consciousness. The first consciousness, winning this battle, becomes the master of the other one. The other, who succumbs out of fear of death, becomes the slave. The master, apparently, wins his freedom through this battle. The slave is forced to work for the master and to recognize the master as the master of this relationship. The slave acquires an immediate relationship to nature through his work. The master only indirectly relates to nature by enjoying the fruits of the slave's work.

The slave's immediate relationship to nature makes the master dependent of the slave. The master-slave relationship is therefore caught in ambiguities whereby the master turns out to be the slave of the slave and *vice versa*. The slave's mastery of nature in fact carries the potentials for freedom along with the slave's willingness to risk his own life to acquire freedom. However, both the master and the slave come to an awareness of the fact that they must recognize one another as free on a mutual basis in order to acquire freedom themseves. The master-slave dialectic ends at this point without finding any practical solutions to the problem. It, hence, remains unclear

whether the socio-economic positions of the master and slave are in need of being changed. It seems reasonable to think that in order to acquire mutual recognition (of each other's freedom), one either needs to change the social order radically, or that some minimal kind of social change will result from the master's and slave's recognition of each other. Such ambiguities have been the source of interpretational pluralism as well as different usages (applications) of the master-slave model. Let me, therefore, start with the Left-Hegelian and Marxist interpretations of this model:

Alexandre Kojève's interpretation of the master-slave dialectic may serve as the examplary case of a Marxist reading of this chapter, since the work of the slave is seen as central to this chapter, both in terms of defining the relationship between the two adversaries, as well as being the very driving force of the slave's emancipation. The master and slave, furthermore, are seen as representatives of the proletariat and bourgeoisie, and Kojève interprets the master-slave dialectic as the evolution of historical types of conflict, on the basis of historical progress of the category of 'work'. 'Work', taken literally in this respect, even provides the slave with the tools for his emancipation, from the axe to the machine gun (Kojève 1980, 51). Herbert Marcuse's interpretation is more idealist and Left-Hegelian in the sense that it is based on the assumption that the chapter presents a reflexive process that brings the consciousness to an awareness of the historical and contextual basis of freedom. Freedom, however, is neither brought into reality in this part of the chapter, nor in the subsequent parts on the stoic and sceptic self-consciousnesses, since these represent subjective forms of freedom that appears in the form of thinking alone (Marcuse 1986, 114-120, esp.).

A historical form of thinking is apparently at stake in the beginning of the chapter of *Self-Consciousness*, in the form of an awareness of the 'I' that is a 'We' (Hegel 1980 [1807], 110-111). Here, Hegel introduces the concept of 'Spirit', that seems to link the topic of self-consciouness to the more concrete forms of historical periods that are presented in the later chapter of *Spirit*.[2] The concept of *Spirit*, however, is not specified in any direction at this point. To what

---

[2] Otto Pöggeler, in fact, interprets the *Phenomenology* in the sense that the relationship between the chapters of *Self-Consciousness* and *Spirit* constitutes the main theme of the work. The abstractive topic of mutual recognition in *Self-Consciousness* is recapitulated in the form of historical relations of recognition in *Spirit*. Cf., (Pöggeler 1993, 231-257 & 264-265, esp.).

extent the master-slave dialectic of the chaper of *Self-Consciousness*, then, opens up for specific historical interpretations, both in relation to the chapter of *Spirit* as well as to historical contexts apart from this chapter, remains an open question. The abstract categories of 'master', 'slave' and 'work' do not, *per se*, point in any specific directions in this respect. The chapter, in fact, seems to present the 'struggle for recognition' in an abstractive and ahistorical sense that turns the theme into an ideal typical form of struggle that could be applied to any historical era.

These last remarks, in fact, is the reason why philosophers like Nicolai Hartmann and Hans-Georg Gadamer have been seeing the 'master-slave'-struggle as an ideal-typical model. On the one hand, this struggle shows the general characteristics of any kind of struggle for recognition. On the other hand, it also shows the conditions for indiviual freedom in terms of mutual recognition. In the master-slave struggle, Hartmann sees the expression of an eternal, sociological kind of law that is at core of any relationship between master and servant:

> Es ist ein ewiges Gesetz im Wesen des Herrschers und Dieners, das Hegel hier herausarbeitet, ein – wenn man so will – ein soziologisches Grundgesetz. (Hartmann 1974, 333)

Gadamer has, in a similar manner, been stressing the universality and ideal typicality of the master-slave model. On the one hand, he criticizes Marxist interpretations for too quickly interpreting the model in terms of a modern class struggle. The struggle Hegel's text is referring to, he says, is more likely to be based on feudal structures of domination and subordinance than on capitalist ones. The category of 'work', then, is more likely to apply to the work of the peasant and the handiworker. The products of the work, hence, may be the fruits of the work with the soil as well as the artifacts of the handiworker (Gadamer 1976, 65). Nevertheless, by seeing this model as an ideal model, one may well apply it to any context involving domination and subordinance. Even if Hegel were not speaking of capitalist class struggles, the model may well be applied to these struggles, or to other struggles appearing in our times.

Discourse ethics and mutual recognition

The condition of mutual recognition assumes a quite different function in discourse ethics, since it here works as a condition for mutual understanding and consensus. Both Habermas and Apel turn to Hegel in their formulations of mutual recognition. In his paper 'Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel's Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics?', Habermas speaks of the symmetry and reciprocity conditions of practical discourses: the participants are supposed to take into consideration the arguments of one another on a mutual basis (Habermas 1990 [1986], 201) [3]. Apel does, in a similar manner, speak of the 'equal right to take part' in a discourse and the 'co-responsibility of the members of a discourse', cf., (Apel 1999, 48) as well as (Apel 1996, 23). The term 'discourse', hence, as used by these two philosophers, may be defined as a dialogue on equal terms. (For convenience purposes, I am also going to adhere to the term 'discourse *proper'*.)

Although the differences between these two philosophers do not form the main theme in this context, there is one specific difference that is worth taking into consideration. Habermas presupposes that the preconditions of symmetry and reciprocity are part of everyday life and ordinary communicative practices. They are at work in a counterfactual manner: whenever we aim at reaching an agreement on a subject matter with another person, we do have to take the arguments of one another into consideration in a truthful, rational manner. His discourse theory, therefore, aims at reconstructing the conditions of valid consensus on basis of these practices and by reformulating them in terms of ideal conditions. Apel does agree with Habermas on this point, but sharpens the cleavage between the ideal and the real status of these conditions, i.e., the symmetry and reciprocity conditions seen as purely ideal conditions on the one hand, and these conditions as part of empirical communicative practices on the other. He claims that we cannot, in any a priori like way, presuppose that these conditions are operable in any communication community that is aiming towards

---

[3] This paper (with the Ger. title: 'Treffen Hegels Einvände gegen Kant auch die Diskursethik zu?') first appeared in 1986, in: Kuhlmann, W. (ed.), *Moralität und Sittlichkeit. Das Problem Hegels und die Diskursethik* (Suhrkamp, 1986). It was not part of the original edition of *Moralbewußtsein und kommunikatives Handeln* (Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp 1983), but was added to Polity Press' English translation of this work (*Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, Cambridge/Massachusetts, Polity Press, 1990).

mutual agreement. Communicative practices are, after all, capable of being corrupted in various ways: by both power structures and economical differences and by uses of rhetorical and manipulative means. Apel, therefore, turns to both Kant and Hegel in this regard. He uses the Kantian divide between "regulative ideas" and empirical facts, and says that in this sense, one must presuppose such a divide between the regulative status of the consensual conditions and the empirical level of communication. Contrary to Hegel, one cannot expect a perfect reconciliation between 'ought' and 'is'. One cannot, hence, expect a full-scale fulfilment of the argumentative conditions within real communication communities:

> Freilich hat die soeben skizzierte Grundnorm (=Metanorm) einer Ethik der Konsensbildung selbst nur den Charakter einer "regulativen Idee", der – nach Kant – "nichts Empirisches völlig korrespondieren kann", d.h. sie kann im Prinzip niemals mit dem konkreten Begreifen der substantiellen Sittlichkeit im Sinne Hegels gleichgesetzt werden; denn wir werden niemals in einer Welt leben, in der die totale Vermittlung von Sein und Sollen – im Sinne Hegels: die Versöhnung der Idee mit sich selbst – Wirklichkeit ist. (Apel 1988, 101)

Useful, therefore, is the divide between understanding oriented and success oriented forms of communication that is at hand in both Habermas' and Apel's positions. Discourses *proper* depend on the understanding oriented type of communication if a valid type of understanding and consensus is to come through. Arguments are supposed to be carried out in a rational manner, for the sake of 'the subject matter at hand' (Ger. *die Sache selbst*) only. Strategic forms of communication that are tied to hidden agendas and/or the usage of power claims cannot, therefore, be part of a discourse *proper*. Discourses, hence, depend on a communicative form of rationality that carries an inherent orientation towards mutual understanding. This communicative rationality is counterpoised to strategic kinds of rationality that rely on hidden agendas or are tied to interests that are not part of the discursive argumentation.[4] In Habermas'

---

[4] Apel makes a distinction between open strategic speech acts (such as threats and intimidations) vs. concealed ones (such as lies and deceptions).Cf., esp., (Apel 1999 [1994]) on this point. Note that (Apel 1999 [1994]) is a translation of (Apel 1998b). Cf., also, (Apel 1996).

terms, strategic types of communication are likely to be oriented towards success rather than understanding (cf. Habermas 1997, 286-290, esp.).

However, the divide between strategic and communicative types of rationality also provides Habermas' position with a critical potential, since the presence of strategic communicative acts within a discursive setting indicates that the argumentative conditions of the discourse *proper* are violated. This divide, then, can be used for critical purposes in order to improve the argumentative process of a discourse. Habermas' divide between the 'ideal discourse' and 'real discourse' is useful in this regard, since the 'ideal discourse' points to the ideal argumentation conditions of the discourse, while the 'real discourse' is used about the empirically given discourse. Apel does, similarly, distinguish between the ideal community of communication and the real community/communities of communication.

Bringing back Hartmann's and Gadamer's 'ideal type' interpretation of Hegel's dialectic of recognition proves to be fruitful in this regard. Apel's ideal community of communication may well work as a ideal typical model in this manner, since the ideal community can be used as a critical device in order to identify the shortcomings of real communities of communication. The ideal typical status of the conditions of 'mutual recognition' is of special relevance in relation to Apel's ideal community of communication, since Apel sharpens the cleavage between the ideal and real communities of communication. In the next part, I will be looking closer at the differences between Hegel's and Habermas'/Apel's positions.

Hegel and discourse ethics

Discourse ethics' linguistic and communicative transformation of 'mutual recognition' is one of the main differences between Hegel's and Habermas'/Apel's positions. Hegel's master-slave dialectic is not based on a dialogic process, but is only based on an epistemic process that each of the consciousnesses must go through in order to know what freedom really is. This process of acquiring knowledge is, further on, carried out on a solitary basis rather than a common search for truth. The *Phenomenology*-version of the theme of mutual recognition, hence, seems to be based on a philosophy of

consciousness that makes use of the 'monological' approach of the solitary subject. Adding up to this, is the point that the theme is presented in abstractive terms that does not point in any specific, i.e., historical and contextual, direction.[5]

Another difference is also at stake when comparing Hegel's version to Habermas' and Apel's. Hegel's master and slave dialectic provides a generic kind of explanation of the emergence of the master and slave relation through the struggle for freedom through recognition. The idea of freedom through mutual recognition follows as consequence of this process. Discourse ethics, on the other hand, is not concerned with the genesis of the phenomenon of mutual recognition as such. Mutual recognition is rather presupposed as a non-circumventable condition of any understanding and consensus oriented communication. A forced consensus cannot, after all, be considered to be a valid consensus.

The linguistic turn of Apel's and Habermas' positions is central in this regard, since the linguistic turn is part of a communicative and dialogical transformation of Hegel's model of mutual recognition. Both Habermas and Apel have, in addition, been appropriating certain parts from speech acts theories: in addtition to the symmetry and reciprocity conditions, discourses in general also have to presuppose the 'four validity claims' of truth, rightness, sincerity and intelligibility. These are seen as unavoidable, in the sense that one cannot reach a valid consensus unless a truth or rightness claim has been raised by any of the participants: one does, after all, have to agree on something. The truth and rightness claims that are part of the discussion must in addition be intelligible to the participants. And finally, one must presuppose that the participants are sincere and that the truth and rightness claims are put forward on a sincere basis and truthful manner (cf., for instance, Apel 1994, 23,

---

[5] Axel Honneth contrasts the *Phenomenology* version of this theme to earlier versions from Hegel's Jena period, where concrete forms of recognition are found on the contextual level, i.e., in the family, the society and the state. Honneth does, in addition, claim that Hegel's *Phenomenology* represents a 'return to the philosophy of consciousness', and that the interpersonal relationships that are described in the earlier versions are of an intersubjective kind (Honneth 1998, 52-53). Worth to notice is that these concrete forms of 'recognition' also are found in Hegel's later works, like his *Philosophy of Right*. An interesting question in this regard, is whether these concrete relationships are in accordance with the ideal type of mutual recognition that is at stake in the *Phenomenology*?

Habermas 1972, 137-144)[6]. In addition, these two philosophers do also distinguish between practical and theoretical discourses. Habermas' speaks of the two bridging principles of induction and universalisation. (Habermas 1990 [1983]), 63, 65). Theoretical (scientific) discourses depend on an inductive principle, while practical discourses (moral, legal) rely on the universalisation principle:

> (U): For a norm to be valid, the consequences and side effects of its general observance for the satisfaction of each person's particular interests must be acceptable to all. (Habermas 1990 [1986], 197)

Apel's concern is the pequliar kind of meta-normativity that is part of both theoretical and practical discourses. The consensual conditions of 'symmetry and reciprocity' and 'the four validity claims' work as meta-normative conditions of understanding and consensus. In addition, he does not draw any sharp line between theoretical and practical discourses, since scientific decisions may involve practical problems of moral and legal kinds. Rightness claims in the form of disputable norms may be part of scientific discourses as well. In Apel's terms: a switch from a theoretical to a practical discourse is in such cases needed (Apel 1999, 58-59). What is important in this context, are the intersubjective conditions that are part of this conception.

   The model that Apel works out, is a subject-cosubject-object-model of discourse ethics and discourse theory[7]. The subject - cosubject - relationship (*Subjekt-Kosubjekt*) and the subject-object-relationship work as complementary relations within this model. The subject - cosubject - relationship has been given priority within Apel's thinking, and with it also the criterion of consensus. Claims to truth, as well as claims to rightness, can only be vindicated within a subject-cosubject-model, and thereby "truth" can never be conceived from the solitary individual's point of view (cf., Apel 1994, 26, Apel 1999, 45-46).

---

[6] In (Habermas 1972), Habermas refers to all these four claims, and the first validity claim, intelligibility, is formulated in a more extended manner than within his later accounts. In (Habermas 1997, 278, 307), Habermas only refers to the three claims of truth, rightness and truthfulness/sincerity, even if it seems reasonable to think of 'intelligibilty' as a precondition of the other three claims, since claims to truth, rightness as well as sincerity need to be understandable to the hearer.

[7] Habermas has been adhering to the term 'discourse theory' in his later works since 1992, and this term is supposed to comprise both practical and theoretical discourses. The terms 'discourse ethics' and 'discourse theory' do for the main time, in his earlier works and also in Apel's works, refer to the different realms of practical and theoretical discourses, respectively.

The differences between moral discourses and legal/political discourses are acknowledged by both Habermas and Apel. These differences are of interest in this respect, since moral discourses are based on interpersonal relations on a face-to-face basis while political discourses are based on representation rather than participation.[8] The possibility of taking part oneself is important in this respect, since it affects the person's possibility of influencing the decisions made. The principle of 'U' does, after all, state that 'the consequences and side effects of the norms general observance for the satisfaction of each person's particular interests must be acceptable to all'. Other differences between the moral and politica/legal realm are also of relevance, since legal rules are based on the state's power monopoly *vis-a-vis* its citizens. In addition, legal rules are supposed to be based on generalizable interests that result from political decision making processes, and not the particular interests of each and every person. Habermas has therefore seen the need to formulate a more general version of the universalisation principle, the socalled 'discourse principle' of (D) that on a more general basis states that norms need to be in accordance with the interests of affected persons:

> (D): Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses. (Habermas 1996 [1992], 107)

Note that the principle of (D) states that the <u>possibly</u> affected persons <u>in principle</u> should be given the possibility to take part in a rational discourse. This formulation of the principle is, therefore, in accordance with the democratic type of discourse. The possibility of taking part oneself in moral discourses, on the other hand, is the reason why Apel thinks of the moral discourse as the one that is most closely to the ideal conditions of the discourse (cf., Apel 2002, esp.)[9]. The moral discourse, then, can be said to work closely to the ideal type of 'mutual recognition'. Other discourses, like those of the political and legal kind, only approximate the conditions to fuller or lesser degrees. Habermas, on the other hand, does not provide the moral type of discourses with any primordial function: in *Faktizität und Geltung* he works out a differentiated model that takes

---

[8] On this point, cf., also, (Cortina 1993).

[9] The difference between the two principles of (D) and (U) is also at stake in (Hedberg 2011, 53-57, esp.).

into consideration the differences between moral and political/legal discourses (cf., Habermas 1996 [1992], 118-131, esp.). The disagreements between these two philosophers in this regard, have been concerning both the status of the ideal discourse in relation to real discourses, as well as the status of moral discourses in relation to other practical discourses (cf., (Apel 1998c) as well as (Habermas 2003).).

Within discourse ethics/discourse theory, the idea of mutual recognition is foremost based on the communicative approach to understanding and consensus. Mutual recognition, then, works as a condition for valid consensus, and is based on the equal right to take part in a discourse and the duty to take the arguments of each other into consideration on an equal basis. The idea of 'equal rights', then, seems to be central to discourse ethics. Taking into consideration the function of mutual recognition as condition for freedom in Hegel's version, the folllowing question remains:

What, then, is freedom, based on Apel and Habermas approach to mutual recognition?

Freedom: communicative and contextual

In *Faktizität und Geltung*, Habermas turns to communicative freedom in relation to civil rights (Ger. *Freiheits- und Teilnahmerechte*) that are part of constitutional democracies. Here, he says that:

> Communicative freedom exists only between actors who, adopting a performative attitude, want to reach an understanding with one another about something and expect one another to take positions on reciprocally raised validity claims. (Habermas 1996 [1992], 119)

The relationship between communicative freedom and civil rights is of interest in this regard, since civil, democratic, rights contain specific forms of individual liberties and in this sense work as more contextualised versions of 'freedom'. The communicative form of freedom is also a part of democratic rights, since formal rights like the freedom of speech and freedom to vote and take part in voluntary associations depend on communicative freedom. These rights are also based on the individuals' respect for the rights of one another through their respect for the law.

What, then, about material rights in relation to formal rights, such as freedom of speech and freedom of conscience? By taking into consideration the Left-Hegelian interpretations of Hegel, material rights may assume an important function in this sense, since socio-economic differences may affect the possibility of taking part in political processes. This is especially so in cases of grave differences between different strata of the population. Securing some minimal levels of living, then, seems to be vital for political part-taking.

In *Faktizität und Geltung*, Habermas works out a list of 5 basic rights that include both formal and material rights. Here, the 'political autonomy of the citizen', the 'equal right to take part in political processes and associations', and the 'legal protection of the individual' work as basic premises.[10] These first three rights, however, are supplemented by two extended rights that stress the legal and also the socio-economic basis of these rights. Their constitutional basis is secured by being part of legitimate law. These rights are also being connected to social and ecological life-conditions that secure the equal opportunities of citizens. The last of these rights, clearly, represents a material type of basic rights.

May, 'freedom' in this sense both be interpreted as a freedom of opportunity (equal right to take part) as well as a distributive form of justice? This seems to be the case in Habermas' version of it. Habermas does, however, aslo claim that ideas of distributive justice are part of a discursive process. In Torben Hviid-Nielsen's interview with Habermas in *Justification and Application*[11], Habermas turns to the discussion of distributive versus 'equal rights' types of justice (Habermas 1993, 152). Here, it seems clear that questions concerning different ideas of justice are left to real discourses to decide.

Are, then, material rights to be subordinated to the decisions made by discourses adhering to communicative freedom? This seems to be the answer provided for by Habermas. One may, nevertheless, think of material rights as an important part of the conditions of political freedom. Securing some minimal income level can be vital for political participation. Apel, therefore, think it is

---

[10] For the complete list of these basic rights categories, see (Habermas 1996 [1992], 122-123).

[11] This interview is added to the English translation of the work. Worth to notice is that this English translation only contains the first three chapters of the original work.

important to work for improved conditions also at an international level. In *Globalization and the Need for Universal Ethics*, he says that:

> Conceived of more radically, the regulative principle of striving for unrestricted consensus must even be capable of initiating and regulating a change of the political conditions of consensus-formation towards taking into account the interests of all affected parties, for example, the interests and possible arguments of the poor in the Third World who, up to now, to a large part have been excluded from all politically and economically relevant dialogues about their situation. (Apel 2000, 152)

This means that the conditions of 'symmetry and reciprocity' can be applied to both small-scale and large-scale groups in order to identify possible obstacles to the argumentative form of freedom.

'Freedom and equality'. Concluding remarks

Central to Left-Hegelian and Marxist interpretations of Hegel's master and slave dialectic stands the idea that freedom cannot be achieved without socio-economic type of equality. In the Marxist version, equality equals to 'equality in result' rather than 'equality in process'. Ideally seen, then, the master and slave dialectic should lead to socio-economic changes as well, making the slave and master equal to another also in relation to 'work' and 'nature'.

In Habermas' (and Apel's) version, freedom is foremost interpreted in terms of 'equal rights'. However, the issue of distributive justice makes clear that material conditions may work contrary to equal rights. 'Equal rights' are not always equal to 'equal opportunities'. Discourse ethics, hence, takes into consideration the two-way problem that is involved in the democratic form of equal rights. On the one hand, democatic discourses cannot be tied to the income and welfare levels of its participants. On the other hand, social welfare policies may influence the population's political participation, especially in times of economic crisis.

In his concluding remarks to 'Discourse ethics', Habermas makes clear that:

Universalist moralities are dependent on forms of life that are rationalized in that they make possible the prudent application of universal moral insights and support motivations for translating insights into moral action. Only those forms of life that meet universalist moralities halfway in this sense fulfill the conditions necessary to reverse the abstractive achievements of decontextualization and demotivation. (Habermas 1990 [1983], 109)

Bibliography:

Apel, Karl-Otto (1988), 'Kant, Hegel und das aktuelle Problem der normativen Grundlagen von Moral und Recht', in: Apel (1988), *Diskurs und Verantwortung. Das Problem des Übergangs zur postkonventionellen Moral,* Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 69-102.

--- (1994), 'Die hermeneutische Dimension von Sozialwissenschaft und ihre normative Grundlage', in: Apel, K-O & Kettner, M. (Hrsg.)(1994), *Mythos Wertfreiheit? Neue Beiträge zur Objektivität in den Human-und Kulturwissenschaften.* Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag, 17-49.

--- (1996), 'Die Vernunftfunktion der kommunikativen Rationalität. Zum Verhältnis von konsensual-kommunikativer Rationalität, strategischer Rationalität und Systemrationalität', in: Apel, K-O & Kettner, M. (red.) (1996), *Die eine Vernunft und die vielen Rationalitäten*, Frankfurt a.M, Suhrkamp, 17-42.

--- (1998a), 'Normative Begründung der 'Kritischen Theorie' durch Rekurs auf Lebensweltliche Sittlichkeit? Ein transzendentalpragmatisch orienterter Versuch, mit Habermas gegen Habermas zu denken', in: Apel (1998), *Auseinandersetzungen in Erprobung des Transzendentalpragmatischen Ansatzes,* Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 649-701.

--- (1998b*),* 'Das Problem des offen strategischen Sprachgebrauchs in transzendentalpragmatischer Sicht. Ein zweiter Versuch, mit Habermas gegen Habermas zu denken', in: Apel (1998), *Auseinandersetzungen in Erprobung des Transzendentalpragmatischen Ansatzes,* Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 701-727.

--- (1998c), 'Auflösung der Diskusethik? Zur Architektonik der Diskursdifferenzierung in Habermas' *Faktizität und Geltung*. Ein dritter Versuch, mit Habermas gegen Habermas zu denken', in: Apel (1998), *Auseinandersetzungen in Erprobung des Transzendentalpragmatischen Ansatzes,* Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 729-839.

--- (1999) [1994], 'Openly strategic uses of language: a transcendental-pragmatic perspective (a second attempt to think with Habermas against

Habermas)', in: Dews (ed.)(1999), *Habermas. A Critical Reader.* Oxford/Massachusetts, Blackwell Publishers, 272-291.

--- (1999), *The Response of Discourse Ethics to the Moral Challenge of the Human Situation as Such and Especially Today* (Mercier Lectures, Louvain-la-Neuve, March 1999.) Leuven, Belgium, Peeters, 2001.

--- (2000), 'Globalization and the Need for Universal Ethics', in: *European Journal of Social Theory* 3(2), 137-155.

--- (2002), 'Regarding the relationship of morality, law and democracy: on Habermas's *Philosophy of Law* (1992) from a transcendental-pragmatic point of view', in: Aboulafia, M. & Bookman, M. & Kemp, C. (eds.)(2002), *Habermas and Pragmatism*, London and New York, Routledge, 17-30.

Cortina, Adela (1993): 'Diskursethik und partizipatorische Demokratie', in: Dorschel, Kettner, Kuhlmann & Niquet (Eds.)(1993): *Transzendentalpragmatik. Ein Symposium für Karl-Otto Apel.* Frankfurt   a.M.: Suhrkamp, 238-257.

Dews, Peter, red. (1999), *Habermas. A Critical Reader*, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford/Massachusetts.

Gadamer, H-G (1976), *Hegel`s Dialectic, Five Hermeneutical Studies.* New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1976.

Habermas, Jürgen. (1972), 'Wahrheitstheorien', in: Habermas, J. (1989), *Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 127-183.

--- (1990), *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action* (*Moralbewußtsein und kommunikatives Handeln*, Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 1983), Cambridge/Massachusetts, Polity Press, 1990,

--- (1990)[1983], "Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification," in: Habermas (1990), *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, Cambridge/Massachusetts, Polity Press, 1990, 43-116.

--- (1990) [1986], 'Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel's Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics?' in: Habermas (1990), *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, Cambridge/Massachusetts, Polity Press, 195-215.

--- (1996)[1992], *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtstaats*. Suhrkamp, 1992) Cambridge, MA, Polity Press.

--- (1993), *Justification and Application*, (*Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik*, Suhrkamp, 1991), Cambridge/Massachusetts, Polity Press, 1993.

--- (1997), *The Theory of Communicative Action* (*Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, Suhrkamp, 1981), Volume I, Cambridge/Massachusetts, Polity Press, 1997.

--- (1999), *Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung*, Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 1999.

--- (2003), *Zur Architektonik der Diskursdifferenzierung. Kleine Replik auf eine große Auseinandersetzung*, in: Böhler & Kettner & Skirbekk (eds.) (2003), *Reflexion und Verantwortung*, Frankfurt a.M, Suhrkamp, 44-64.

Hartmann, Nicolai (1974) [1923/29], *Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus,* Berlin/New York, Walter de Gruyter.

Hedberg, Petra (2011), 'The Validity of Human Rights and the Problem of Religious Fundamentalism', in: Ulrika Martensson, Jennifer Bailey, Priscilla Ringrose, Asbjorn Dyrendal (eds.) (2011) *Fundamentalism in the Modern World: Fundamentalism and Communication*: *Culture, Media and the Public Sphere*; Vol. 2, London, I.B. Tauris: 49-72.

Hegel, G.W.F. (1980)[1807], *Phänomenologie des Geistes.* Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg,1988.

Honneth, Axel (1998), *Kampf um Anerkennung*, Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 1998.

Kojève, Alexandre (1980)[1947], *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, Cornell University Press, 1980

Marcuse. Herbert (1986)[1941], *Reason and Revolution*, London and Henley, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986.

Mill, John Stuart (1985) [1859], *On Liberty*. London, Penguin Books LTD, 1985.

Pöggeler, Otto (1993), *Hegels Idee einer Phänomenologie des Geistes*, München, Verlag Karl Amber, 1993.