Contractualism and the Second-Person Moral Standpoint

This article explores Darwall’s second-­‐personal account of morality, which draws on Fichte’s practical philosophy, particularly Fichte’s notions of a summons and principle of right. Darwall maintains that Fichte offers
a philosophically more appealing account of relations of right than Kant. Likewise, he thinks that his second--personal interpretation of morality gives rise to contractualism. I reject Darwall’s criticism of Kant’s conception of right. Moreover, I try to show that Darwall’s
second-­‐personal  conception of morality relies on a Kantian
form of contractualism. Instead of accepting Darwall’s claim that contractualism depends upon a second-­‐personal
account of morality, I will argue that contractualism provides the foundations not only for second-­‐personal moral relations, but also for first-­‐personal moral authority.