Contractualism and the Second-Person Moral Standpoint

Pauer-Studer, Herlinde (2014) Contractualism and the Second-Person Moral Standpoint. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 90. pp. 149-168.

[thumbnail of Contractualism and the Second-person Moral Standpoint.pdf] PDF
Contractualism and the Second-person Moral Standpoint.pdf

Download (225kB)


This article explores Darwall’s second-­‐personal account of morality, which draws on Fichte’s practical philosophy, particularly Fichte’s notions of a summons and principle of right. Darwall maintains that Fichte offers
a philosophically more appealing account of relations of right than Kant. Likewise, he thinks that his second--personal interpretation of morality gives rise to contractualism. I reject Darwall’s criticism of Kant’s conception of right. Moreover, I try to show that Darwall’s
second-­‐personal  conception of morality relies on a Kantian
form of contractualism. Instead of accepting Darwall’s claim that contractualism depends upon a second-­‐personal
account of morality, I will argue that contractualism provides the foundations not only for second-­‐personal moral relations, but also for first-­‐personal moral authority.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Allgemeine Ethik
Philosophie > Philosophische Institutionen > Institut für Philosophie, Wien
Depositing User: sandra subito
Date Deposited: 06 Dec 2020 16:15
Last Modified: 06 Dec 2020 16:15

Actions (login required)

View Item
View Item