Was Searle's Descriptivism Refuted?

Green, Karen (1998) Was Searle's Descriptivism Refuted? Teorema, XVII (1). pp. 109-113.

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Abstract

It is generally thought that Searle's cluster theory of the sense of a proper name was soundly refuted by Kripke in Naming and Necessity. This paper challenges this widespread belief and argues that the observations made by Kripke do not show that Searle's version of descriptivism is false. Indeed, charitably interpreted, Searle's theory retains considerable plausibility.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Descriptivism; Language; Name; Necessity; Proper Name; Reference; Kripke S.; Searle J.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Teorema. Revista internacional de filosofia > Volume XVII (1998)
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Logik, analytische Philosophie
Depositing User: Wolfgang Heuer
Date Deposited: 06 Dec 2020 14:02
Last Modified: 06 Dec 2020 14:02
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at:8080/id/eprint/2786

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