Is Explaining Intuition Compatible with Trusting it?

First, a summary of anti-naturalist criticism of explanationism,
taking Th. Nagel"s work (1997) as typical. A common
assumption in the debate is the following one: if there
is a causal explanation of our intuitions, it will appeal to the
design of our mind, and ultimately to the causal-historical
forces shaping it. In other words, the thinkers find their
intuitions immediately compelling because they, the intuitions,
reflect the built-up of thinker"s minds. The intuitioncontents,
on the other hand, tend to be true, since the
built-up of the mind reflects the most general structures of
reality that has been causally shaping it. Most explanationists
offer the design account as the best available
explanation-sketch. The anti-explanationists, from Kant
(Critique of Pure reason, B 176) through Wittgensteinians
(e.g., J: Lear) to Th. Nagel (1997), G. Bealer (1987) and J.
Pust (2001), perform a modus tollens on this designfocused
account. Since it is self-undermining and has unacceptable
normative conesquences it should be rejected,
they claim. Here is Nagel"s recent formulation of the use of
evolutionary hypothesis about the origin of our minddesign.