Worldhood Competence and Performance: The Site for Wittgenstein's Religious Language

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1

It is common knowledge that Wittgenstein cannot be called fundamentally a religious writer. All the same, he did not dismiss the reality 'religion' as nonsense. It is opined here that, Wittgenstein was very consistent in his references to it. We strongly claim that religion was a subject of his philosophical preoccupation positioned among his general striking similes, arresting moments and connections of his general methods. Religion gained occasional and/or scattered referencing in his works (e.g. the notes of 1938, the positioning of religion and/or theology as grammar in the 'Philosophical Investigations (PI: 373; p.283), Zettel and the later work 'Culture and Value). Despite the above, we have to agree, with Wittgenstein, that his poetic compositions are to be understood and seen in consistent connections (PI: 122) even when they look disconnected. One therefore, has every ground to connect 'religion' with:

(a) The ways of looking at things (cf. PI: 144);

(b) As an aspect of presenting things in plain view (cf. PI : 89);

(c) As part of the state of affairs we should not overlook (cf. PI: 89).

In order to avoid every misunderstanding, Wittgenstein presents a methodology that guarantees active and practical understanding of this social physics, which he calls the world. At the same time his work provides an understanding of the world that allows us to 'go on' with or without much confusion within the given social practice. We may not forget that Wittgenstein's achievement gives us the disposition and toolbox with which we have to review our human behavior as connected with the totality of the world and the facts of the state of affairs (cf. Tractatus: 1-1.2). In the views of Wittgenstein, human behavior is made out of sensible follower-ship of sociality. This is only possible through the stances of what we have called in this paper 'worldhood'. This paper posits that even the question of religion can be answered with Wittgenstein's worldhood conception. This is possible especially when we try to see facts of being-in-the-world through the ability to make use of the phenomenon of the 'reminders' (cf. PI: 127) and the reality of living our lives in the practice of everyday language-mental-state and reservoir. To 'go on' into the background of Wittgenstein's worldhood experiment, we would like to inform ourselves about the language-entwined practice of the concept. It was Sapir (1929: 207) who once said that:

> "Human beings do not live in the objective world alone... but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society... The fact of the matter is that the real world is to a large extent unconsciously built upon the language habits of the group... We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation".

The above position takes us now to the issues of Wittgenstein's concept of world, and the implied 'worldhood'. The first reminder is that the Wittgensteinian world and its leitmotif 'worldhood' are language-games tested in social practice and rules of sociality- since *'ubi societas ibi jus'.*

2

It is the language (I use) that limits the world since 'the limit of my language becomes the limit of my world' (Tractatus: 5.6; 5.62; 5.621; 5.632). The world is this world made manifest through the facts of the language I understand and this world and my life are one and I am therefore my world -the microcosm. To expand this issue more, King (1963:73) states that:

> "The world is not a thing, but man himself is worldish: he is, at the bottom of his being, world disclosing, and world forming."

The Wittgensteinian world is that which can be mirrored in and through language. Wittgenstein's expression of the 'signal', 'understanding' and the conviction and/or knowledge that 'one knows he/she can go on' is a worldhood followable responsibility indicative of a situated and socially conducted and/or constituted form of life. Worldhood is the after-effect of environmentality, historicity, cooperative engagement, relationship and the interplay of activity commonly shared in the family (speech community) focus. 'The world is all that is the case' (cf. Tractatus: 1). For Wittgenstein worldhood is practically onto-linguistic. Sefler (1974:188f) in this case says that:

> "Language and the world are two sides of the same reality. The world I know is known inseparably from the language I use. One cannot split the two and discuss them in isolation without some literal misrepresentation... An investigation of the structure of language is at the same time an investigation of the formal aspects of the world. To give the essence of propositions means to give the essence ... of the world".

Worldhood, therefore, is ontolinguistic *sui generis.* This is what Heidegger noted as the 'Being of Entities' which according his '*Dasein*'s' conception belongs essentially to a world. Thus an understanding of *Dasein* pertains with entities that become accessible within the world. Under this ontolinguistic approach, we have to emphasize that man-hood is world-hood and worldhood must be found within the toolbox of language. Our talks, says Wittgenstein, get their meaning from our proceedings and we cannot use language to get out of language. We can only find a 'world-about-ness' inside our own language forms of life. Our worldhood is the state of affairs in a landscape of grammatical and social geography. Worldhood is not a theoretical stance but a forum for acute practice. It is the practice of 'going on' with one another in a social setting. We are in the world of 'rule follow-able fellowship'. It is an interactive moment of participation in even a possible blind obedience to the rule (cf. PI: 219). Obeying the set rules means pure practice (cf. PI: 202) jointly regulated through the language 'use'.

3

One important question that now follows the above issue is that of the Wittgensteinian balance between language as a social nature and that of language as an individual nature. The so-called 'private language argument' (PI: 244-272, especially 256) strikes this balance question. Under this balance we hereby present our concept of competence and performance in this paper. We can understand Wittgenstein's position that language is a 'sharable game' that is made manifest in praxis and expression, acquaintance and action. We understand in this regard that a language user can name and/or express, *stricto sensu*, sense data he/she is acquainted with since one can not use language to get out of language. The sharp implication here is that language on the individual nature can, to some extent, be considered 'private' and this is the competence sphere and on the social nature, language must be 'public' as to contain the performance sphere. From this framework we shall be looking at language competence and performance as communicative act within the 'rule' of the game.

"Communicative competence...can be seen as the innate knowledge which permits the user of a language to create and comprehend utterances, to issue the communicative tokens of speech acts, in which language operates as an open system in constant interaction with its environment ... A specification of communicative competence can be recognized as an attempt to define not only how a user is able to judge grammatically but also how he is able to recognize what is acceptable as a speech act in a social situation" (Bell 1983:207).

Communicative competence means the individual innate disposition, capacity and basic qualification in comprehensive functionality of the given socially constituted symbolic forms. It is the mastery of an ideal speech situation (cf. Habermas 1970:138). Performance on the other hand, is the practical and/or 'acting out' of the said competence. This includes the appropriated 'doing of the language'. In this case, the performing individual is no longer talking about the knowledge of the language but doing the language within the following outfit:

Language -

Setting and scene,	(S)
Participation,	(P)
Ends,	(E)
Act sequence,	(A)
Key,	(K)
Instrumentalities,	(I)
Norms,	(N)
Genres	(G)

On the grounds of the above, Hymes (1972:269-293) developed the acronym "speaking". This is performance clearly identified. In the views of Chomsky(1965:10-15), for example, competence and performance depend on the following issues:

The formal framework with respect to the norms of the particular language and culture;

The extent of feasibility for immediate comprehension;

The appropriate performance factors;

The transformational and/or generative possibilities of doing through the language.

In the light of the above, we can once more look at Wittgenstein's worldhood conception from his language/ linguistic cognitive aspirations. The world and language are the comprehensive data for being-in-the-world. Puhl (1994:340) says to this effect that:

"Wittgenstein stresses the dispositional character of self-ascriptions of intentional states. Their truth seems to be dependent on what the subject in question later does and says... What counts as fulfillment of an intentional state seems to be constituted by the way speakers react, not what is 'in their heads'".

What really matters for Wittgenstein is the language 'use' (Okonkwo 2003:111-129) and its socio-linguistic content (Okonkwo 2002: 451-467) imbued in action and reaction of sharable (religious) 'belief' practices and acquaintances. When Wittgenstein says 'I can go on', there are two serious options to underline. One is that the expression 'I' implies the individual act of competence, and, two the applied 'can go on' is indicative of the complexities of performance since 'obeying a rule is a practice' (cf. PI: 202).

4

What we have termed 'worldhood' stands as the practice, which paves the way to the possibilities of creating ways of 'going on' to religion. The issue here is not directed towards the phenomenon called religion but, as Wittgenstein might say, towards the possibilities of this phenomenon (cf. PI: 90). At the same time we may not forget that we must 'let the use of words teach us their meaning' (PI: p.220e). Religion and religious beliefs (practices) fall within the phenomena of worldhood complexities. But at the same time when we read from the Tractatus (6.432) 'God does not reveal himself in the world' there seems to be a contradiction to the major issue of this paper. There is no doubt that Wittgenstein does not speak about religion and religious belief *in vacuo.* Religion and religious belief are words that teach 'meaning'. They are conceptual equipments dealing with the world and also determining worldish roles played within the landscape of experience and worldview. In this context one can conveniently assert that there is a 'use' and a 'need' for religious language. Religion and religious belief belong to everyday - ordinary language of the 'riddle of life in the world'. Tractatus (6.5) tells us that when an answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question about the issue be put into words. The riddle in this case does not exist. If a question can be framed at all about religion and religious belief, it is also very possible to answer it. The answer to the questions about religion and beliefs is possibly answerable through the worldview landscape, sharable in language (game) and/or everyday practice. Religion is not definable outside the worldhood conception. It is (language) grammar that tells about the essence of a thing or phenomenon (PI: 371; 373). Language has both connotative and denotative reminders. As a caveat, we have to say that every high-tension of religious 'mythicalness' can only be downloaded by the low-tension of worldhood (cf. Zettel: 717).

5

The site of all religious practices (knowledge and beliefs) and all the 'mythicalness' involved gain existence and manifestation in the world of language where games are open to interaction (PI: 584). Competence and performance in worldhood means that religious belief is a contextual, sharable and knowledgeable experience. We can remember that Wittgenstein (Zettel: 144) says that 'how words are understood is not told by words alone' but by the context of application we can understand the meaning of the word. Religious knowledge (belief) belongs to the ethics and/or *ethos* of worldhood as *'modus cum munus'* of seeing the world aright (cf. Tractatus: 6.521; 654). It is in this case certain that it is the worldhood competence and performance (*mundus sensibilis*) that make our religious knowledge (belief) complete. We may not forget that the religious subject (the microcosm) knows his religious world and the language thereof. It will at the same time be quite wrong to see religion as an aspect of the problem of solipsism (cf.Schulte 2001:193-212). We may conclude with Schoenbaumsfeld (2001:190) that:

> "Der Glaube ist die Säule der religiösen Lebensform... Rüttelt man daran, zerstört man ein ganzes Weltbild und nicht bloß eine einzelne Überzeugung".

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