Schurz, Gerhard (2003) Bayesian Arguments for Weak Foundationalism. In: Pre-Proceedings of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Kirchberg am Wechsel, pp. 323-324.
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Abstract
In this talk I give some simple arguments why there is an
intrinsic need in Bayesian epistemology for a weak kind of
foundationalism and for objective probabilities. My
arguments are as follows:
| Item Type: | Book Section |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Jeffrey conditionalization; Bayesian Arguments |
| Subjects: | Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2003 Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Logik, analytische Philosophie |
| Depositing User: | Wolfgang Heuer |
| Date Deposited: | 06 Dec 2020 15:01 |
| Last Modified: | 06 Dec 2020 15:01 |
| URI: | http://sammelpunkt.philo.at:8080/id/eprint/3171 |
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