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Kantian Ethics and Aristotelian Emotions: A Constructive Interpretation*

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RESUMEN

Las lecturas tradicionales de historia de la filosofía moral occidental consideran que la ética kantiana, por su enfoque racionalista deontológico, es incompatible con los postulados teleológicos aristotélicos que exigen del agente moral una vida educada en la armonía emocional con la virtud. Sin embargo, hace unas décadas algunos historiadores occidentales de filosofía moral han ofrecido un enfoque interpretativo según el cual los desacuerdos entre ambas teorías éticas estarían tan sólo del lado de la psicología moral, y no del lado de la ética normativa. En defensa de una mayor cercanía teórica entre ambos enfoques de filosofía moral mostraré, siguiendo una estrategia interpretativa constructivista, que una teoría cognitivista neoaristotelica de las emociones es incorporable a una ética kantiana —dejando a un lado la cuestión histórica— ya que los problemas de la heteronomía y de la sobredeterminación que parece presentar tal incorporación no son realmente insolubles. Ahora bien, aunque (1) exista la coincidencia con Aristóteles en la primacía ética del principio de volición racional y (2) sea incorrecto hacer de un kantiano un partidario neoestoico de la extirpación de las emociones, la teoría moral kantiana contiene notables divergencias en ética normativa respecto de la aristotélica, de modo que esta última resulta teóricamente más satisfactoria que la primera. Las razones de ello son que la teoría ética aristotélica permite (a) dar cuenta de los casos de relaciones personales, (b) conceder mayor valor moral al virtuoso o agente armónico que al meramente continente moral, reconociendo la relevancia ética de la felicidad del virtuoso y de la presencia de emociones morales, y (c) ofrecer un enfoque razonable y psicológicamente realista de la naturaleza prudencial de la razón práctica desde el particularismo moral. Con el fin de mostrar cómo las ventajas del enfoque aristotélico podrían incorporarse a la perspectiva kantiana, esbozaré al final una concepción cognitivista de las emociones que me permita distinguir entre meras inclinaciones o emociones simples (a las que Kant suele referirse con escepticismo) y emociones domesticadas o entrenadas, un subconjunto de las cuales serían las emociones morales, cuya presencia sería condición necesaria para configurar el carácter del agente moral virtuoso neokantiano propuesto.

ABSTRACT

Most historians of moral philosophy have considered the Kantian approach to rational dutiful action as incompatible with the Aristotelian view of the emotionally trained moral agent. However, some moral philosophers hold now that Kantian and Aristotelian ethics are almost compatible with each other, that a deep affinity exists

between the two views and that the differences between them lie in their ideas on moral psychology, not in their ideas on normative ethics. I agree that, in spite of the traditional reading of Kant, (1) the two accounts share the idea of the necessity of a rational principle of volition, so that only reflective motivation can be the source of moral action and that (2) emotions are not necessarily excluded from the Kantian theory of moral motivation, insofar as the heteronomy problem and the overdetermination problem can be solved. Thus, it would be unfairly reductionist to see Kant as a neo-Stoic philosopher defending the extirpation of emotions. Nevertheless, even if we read his writings in a generous vein, I would say that we can identify some important normative differences between Kantian and Aristotelian ethics, as Kant would consider the Aristotelian continent or self-controlled agent as a wholly virtuous agent. I will assume, leaving aside historical accuracy, that it is possible nonetheless to accommodate a neo-Aristotelian cognitivist view of moral emotions to a Kantian picture, in order to account for (1) cases of personal relationships, (2) the prudential nature of practical reason, (3) the necessary requirements of the moral character and (4) the moral worth of the happiness of the harmonic agent (my argument of the dutiful emotional harmony.) Finally, I sketch a cognitivist theory of emotions, which allows me to make a distinction between *raw emotions* (mostly neglected by Kant) and *tamed* or *trained emotions*, on the one hand, and *fitting* versus *appropriate* emotions on the other, necessary to show that appropriate moral trained emotions are not only epistemically good guides for evaluative judgements, but also morally worthy ingredients of a good life.

Most historians of moral philosophy have considered the Kantian approach to rational dutiful action as incompatible with the Aristotelian view of the emotionally trained moral agent. However, some moral philosophers, like Korsgaard (1996a) hold that Kantian and Aristotelian ethics are almost compatible with each other, that a deep affinity exists between the two views and that the differences between them lie in their ideas on moral psychology, not in their ideas on normative ethics. I agree that, in spite of a usual traditional reading of Kant, the two accounts share the idea of the necessity of a rational principle of volition so that only reflective motivation can be the source of moral action. Henson (1979), Herman (1981) and Sherman (1990) have offered compelling arguments supporting an interpretive approach, particularly for the Kantian moral role of emotions, that is, that emotional inclinations are not necessarily excluded from his theory of moral motivation, thus placing Kant's ethics somehow closer to Aristotle's educational idea that moral agents require emotional training. Although Kant's account of inclinations in *The doctrine of virtue* or in *Religion within the limits of reason alone* conflicts with his own previous account in the *Groundwork* , it would be unfairly reductionist to see him as a neo-Stoic philosopher defending the extirpation of emotions.[1] There are sound reasons, then, for doubting that in Kantian ethics there is no role for cooperating emotions in morally worthy action.[2]

Nevertheless, Korsgaard's (1996a) thesis should not be seen as wholly non-contentious with regard to certain details related to the role of emotions

in Kantian ethics, even if we read Kant's writings in a generous vein. I would say that we can identify some important normative differences in emotion theory as it is presented in Kantian and Aristotelian ethics. I will assume that it is nonetheless possible to accommodate a neo-Aristotelian cognitivist view of moral emotions to the Kantian picture. So my presentation will propose an enlargement of the core of Kantian ethics which is in disagreement with an approach that sees moral emotions as either completely separable from, or only contingently related to, accounts of moral reason.

Underlying my comments on the normative role of emotions in ethics is a minimal metaphysical statement which would be at odds with a constructivist reading of Kant. I endorse metaethical realism: I do not believe that ethical judgements are preference judgements, or that values are brought into the world via human beings, if this is taken to mean that "without men everything would be permitted." Against relativism, the sentimentalist Humean tradition and from a minimal realism in ethics as in aesthetics, I hold that a moral agent has to possess a sensitivity cultivated through emotional dispositions, a kind of ethical *bon goût.*[3] I think certain objective ethical values are cross-culturally present and even certain basic emotions as well, independently of the anthropological varieties in the associated expressions and the behaviours that trigger them.[4] I take it also that some dispositional and propositional moral trained emotions (other than the tailor-made respect for duty) have more than a contingent instrumental value in a mostly Kantian ethical landscape.

The main normative claims that I will try to defend here can be briefly summarized as follows:

> (a) to be morally successful, a subset of important cases require the presence of suitably acquired emotions (those called *appropriate moral trained emotions*) and their detection by the receptor of the action.
>
> (b) some moral emotions are constitutive of personal integrity and essential for the moral character of the agent (something is morally lacking in a person acting from the right maxims but without the right emotions.)
>
> and (c) the happiness of the harmonic moral agent (deontologically neglected by Kant) should be considered as possessing moral worth, a standard utilitarian position that can be defended also in Kantian terms (I shall advance a positive argument in favour of the emotions-right action harmony: the *argument of dutiful emotional harmony.*)

Claims (a)-(c) involve emotions of a particular kind. I will distinguish between *raw emotions* versus *tamed* or *trained emotions*, on the one hand, and *fitting* versus *appropriate* emotions on the other, both pairs arising from

a cognitivist theory of emotions — nowadays widely embraced by philosophers — even if not so optimistic as extreme judgmentalism.

I

The lesson most of us have learnt from Rawls' writings is how to read the classics generously, to make them say something as reasonable as possible — a kind of hermeneutic charity principle. Accordingly, I shall proceed by offering a presentation of a part of a Kantian ethical account, a kind of constructive interpretation of Kantian ethics, following Korsgaard (1999) and her methodology for Humean ethics. Therefore I will not pursue historical accuracy, but a reconstruction of a view that aspires to use the resources available in Kant's and Aristotle's philosophy, so that they make better sense for me and also express something that I think is correct.[5]

I shall try to show particularly that without a picture of the epistemological and normative role of emotions in ethics the Kantian moral ideal would be suboptimal, insofar as emotional aversion to the right action is a morally suboptimal mental state, whose presence threatens a morally successful career.

Emotions have traditionally been seen as unreliable sources for well-grounded beliefs. Despite a certain revival of psychological and philosophical literature, insufficient attention has been paid to them from the perspective of cognitive science, given that many researchers assume that emotions have no important role in rational action or at most only a disruptive one. [Nash (1987)].[6]

No exception to this, Kant very often expresses his skepticism about the epistemic and ethical role of emotions. They are partial (as they yield particularistic evaluations contrary to the moral requirement of universability), recalcitrant (resistant to the rational control necessary for acting from duty [Sherman (1990), p. 155]) and guided by the principle of happiness or self-love;[7] as such, they are not ethically reliable. At best they have a subsidiary and contingent role in moral life; they possess no unconditioned worth, but at best a contingent one (for instance, they can make the task of good work much easier [GMM 61].)

Because this skepticism seems to be widespread in Kant, it has been common to attribute to Kantian ethical theory what in fact is a false dilemma: that an action may be emotion-based or (exclusive disjunction) duty-based, as Kant denies even the lowest moral value to the sympathetic agent doing the right thing for the sake of the personal pleasure derived (the sophisticated egoistic case.)[8] Specifically, to add emotional ingredients to the Kantian ethical picture presents us *prima facie* with two main problems: the *heteronomy* and *overdetermination* problems.

Emotions can prompt action by accident or by the principle of self-love and therefore without the required autonomy, when the interest lies not in the moral rightness of the action, but in its positive hedonic value[9] for the agent (the *heteronomy problem.*) The *overdetermination problem* results from the possibility that emotions are motivational elements, along with the rational ones. In these cases there is more than one motive for what we do, when in fact one would be sufficient to produce the right action. [Herman (1993)] Nonetheless, both problems can be reasonably solved.

The first problem is solved provided that we allow moral emotions to be present in the agent's moral motivation without taking any account of the principle of happiness. [CPrR 92-93] Every emotion has a hedonic value, so our emotionally-guided behaviour is expected to be guided by this principle: the avoidance of the negative hedonic value and the search for the positive one. Nevertheless, in some fragments Kant accepts that obtaining this positive hedonic value is by no means inconsistent with moral success, provided that the associated pleasure is only a side-effect, a non-teleological ground of the voluntary act.

The second problem is solved appealing to the rational volition principle thesis, [Korsgaard (1996a)] by which the chosen motivation is fixed by only one rational volition principle, according to which I decide either to do my duty or let myself be guided by my own self-interest. I help my friend because I know I should, because it is my duty, and the idea of his future happiness is pleasing to me as well. If my volition principle states the same behaviour in relevant similar cases even if the emotion is not present (Herman's (1981) 'limiting condition'), my action is a moral one.

Now, though some emotions are not banned from the Kantian ethical realm — insofar as they are just epiphenomenal or side-effects in the moral motivation for a sympathetic non-self-interested agent — Kantian ethics underestimates their role. Kant would consider Aristotle's continent or self-controlled agent as wholly virtuous. However, Aristotle holds that (rightly cultivated) emotions are necessary ingredients of the moral character [NE 1.8 (1099a), pp. 16-21]. Aristotle thinks it is necessary for the virtuous individual to feel the right emotion at the right time, for the right reason, to the right object, in the right proportion. The harmonic agent (whose emotional state is in tune with the action performed, so that she is pleased with the right action and displeased with the wrong one) is the truly virtuous individual; the self-controlled one has to remind herself to behave morally as she cannot do so out of sympathetic sorrow or joy.

In place of this, Kant sees the emotion-right action disharmony as something that is not morally relevant, although he recognizes the personal benefit for the agent who has internal mental unity and is not in conflict with his own emotional inclinations.[10] In fact, Aristotle's ideal is harder to achieve. Ben-Ze'ev (2000) thinks that in the ideal situation our emotional

tendencies are in harmony with moral norms and makes the interesting point that "the Aristotelian approach may be seen as a kind of preventive medicine; the Kantian approach is more appropriate when the disease has already spread."

In any case, it is rather surprising that Kant occasionally denies the harmonic agent (or 'moral saint') even the condition of a supererogatory ideal, as he holds that harmony is a matter of the agent's personal happiness and has no moral consequence.[11]

Free of the confusion between the rule-fetishism case and the dutiful case [Herman (1993)][12] that we sometimes find in critics of rationalistic ethics, it can be proposed that an ethics of universal rational principles without emotional requirements would not only be epistemologically poor, but would also be psychologically unrealistic and normatively deficient for a sound picture of practical reason, good character and accounts of personal relationships.

Some philosophers today are supporters of the epistemological function of emotions as (a) registers of moral saliencies [sharing Scheler's theory of tertiary qualities: Ben-Ze'ev (2000), De Sousa (1987), Tappolet (2000)], (b) symptoms of moral character (rational calculation can more successfully hide our attitudes than emotions) and (c) moral remainders [Sherman (1990) about emotions of self-assessment like pride or guilt.] As regards the epistemological access to our own motivational set, Kant says that we cannot know the true motives guiding our behaviour (recall the Biblical imperative "do not judge"); neither analytical nor emotional faculties are of any reliable use here. Nonetheless, the features that make emotions apparently unreliable are precisely those that validate them as symptoms of personal character. As they are recalcitrant, only partially under our control, they can provide us with clues to reveal more ethical information about ourselves. Bennett (1974) compared the cases of Huckleberry Finn and Himmler and remarked that sometimes emotion is better suited than reason to the search for ethical value.[13] The more intellectual states are less spontaneous, and are thus more easily concealed or reconstructed by self-deception linked to self-esteem.[14] Think of a case of ingratitude. An old acquaintance of yours, who you do not particularly like (you have always envied her), has helped you in a tragic personal situation, although you ignored her when she asked you for help some months before. Your behavioural response may be ethically suitable (showing apparent gratitude), but the situation causes you displeasure: you do not feel (real) gratitude towards her, although the help she provided deserves it. From the cognitive side you have managed to think that the help was not so important, that after all it was her duty to provide it and that your grateful behaviour is somehow very generous of you. It is your feelings of unease and ingratitude (a regrettable emotion) that are the best indicators of your character, as they may reveal some morally relevant lurking emotions. In fact you are envious of her because she has higher moral standards than you (think of her capacity to forgive, her benevolence) and makes you feel ashamed of your selfish behaviour. Neverthe-

less, it may require a great effort for you to reveal this path, because you may easily disguise your beliefs by self-deception in order to protect your self-esteem: to be aware of every step on this emotional path would threaten your self-image as a decent person.

Your self-perceived spontaneous ingratitude can make you aware of your moral deficiency. Even if emotions are victims also of self-deceptive identifications, it is through them that we can best learn how to become better moral agents.

Taking pleasure in reproaching others their errors or in remarking on their misfortunes [*Schadenfreude*] are immoral emotions consistent with rational and behavioural correction; their presence indicates also a moral deficiency.[15]

Emotionless morals face other serious epistemological hazards, as moral success does not depend on the ability to apply universal principles alone, but needs also a capacity for the perception of particularities generated by a well cultivated sensitivity. The Kantian account of moral reasoning is that practical reason follows a decision-procedure based on universal principles which any rational agent can arrive at. Kantian ethics is not psychologically realistic, because it dismisses the emotional mental ingredient. However there are reasons to claim that ethical theory should be constrained by some tenets about our psychological architecture, as the mental constitution of the receptors of an action should be accounted for in order to assess the goodness of the intended behaviour. This neglect of psychological considerations involves normative failures related to the moral success of the act (cases of personal relations) and also epistemological failures (high moral standards may fail as drivers of good behaviour, given that even with great doses of empathy it is customary to fail to empathize in some situations.)

The Kantian account would be suitable if particular moral cases were subsumed under universal rules as empirical entities are under general laws. Instead, a prudential Aristotelian metaethics[16] warns us against the temptation of conceiving ethical discourse as a theoretical law-like discourse: the situational assessment of the virtuous agent carries the burden of the moral decision and so the highly particularistic emotional evaluations can combine with the universalistic rational ones.[17] (Even for non-supporters of moral particularism, Ross' generalist idea of *prima facie* moral principles is consistent with that point.)

On the other hand, without the emotion-right action harmony not only personal integrity, but also one's future moral action, is in jeopardy. Consider the case of personal relations. It was Williams (1981) who first objected clearly that Kantian rationalistic ethics denied "the (moral) benefit of some human gesture" in cases in which the receptor of the action appreciates only the emotional personal motivation, not to be simply the particular instance of a universal moral rational principle such as "console the afflicted." In the case he describes the wife rescued by her husband might complain if he acted

impersonally, caring only about his duty, not about her. In these cases what counts is above all the emotional expression and the emotional disposition detected. It would be somehow paradoxical that the best course of action could be the non-moral one (an action performed heteronomously by emotional preference for a person), not the action caused by the apathetic rational path. Now, (1) we should not confuse the rule-fetishism case with the dutiful case (the truly virtuous motivation is not "to act for the sake of duty", but "to give the required help"), and (2) we have seen that emotions are not forbidden in Kantian ethics. As Sherman (1993) says: "emotions can be formulatable within a maxim, as expressing indignation when one is treated with malice may be thought of as part of the content of a maxim."[18] However, it remains true that a non-revisionist reading of Kant's writings mostly favours the view that for Kant nothing essential is missing in an action done for the sake of duty without any motivating emotions. To accommodate a cognitivist view of moral emotions to the Kantian theory involves a dismissal of his tenet in GMM 398, when he holds that a temporarily cold person (so afflicted by her grief at the loss of a beloved person that she cannot feel compassion for anyone else) could really act correctly for the sake of duty. As the emotional attachment would be missing, the action performed could not wholly fulfil the moral requirements.

Emotions also play a role in personal happiness. Kant wrote against sympathetic suffering [DV, 35] saying that there cannot be a duty to feel it. Maybe against Humean ethics, he argued that the sympathetic grief for the suffering of someone cannot be a duty, because it would involve an increase in overall world suffering. We can take his very argument and apply it to the harmonic agent case *ad hominem*. A state which increases world suffering and threatens a morally successful career cannot be morally irrelevant, but we have an imperfect duty at least to avoid it. As the non-harmonic agent is less happy than the harmonic one, given that the lack of harmony is a threat for future moral action (increasing evil), then it is rational and moral to cultivate emotions in order to be a harmonic agent (the *argument of dutiful emotional harmony*, with a Pascalian flavour.)[19]

Then, the avoidance of emotional inclinations and therefore of a large part of personal happiness (somehow to be added to the moral satisfaction of being self-controlled) is not at all irrelevant to ethics. Indeed, the search for the accomplishment of the harmonic ideal is also a duty.[20] Emotions are not to be extirpated (the Stoics), nor avoided apathetically (Kant),[21] but regulated or trained both to our benefit and to that of others.

II

It is now time to specify what emotions will enter this predominantly Kantian ethical picture.

Kantian skeptical statements like "no emotion can give an agent a moral interest in action, since it determines the will according to the principle of happiness" [CRPr 92-3; also GMM 640] or "moral feelings are outside of the realm of the will and its principles" [DV, XII, 6] suggest[22] that Kant considers only what might be called 'raw emotions', not 'trained emotions'.[23] He tends to speak of emotions and sensations as if they were similar, forgetting that some emotions are intentional or propositional (Davidson's term): they have objects, not only causes. However, and particularly in DV and R, Kant holds that love and respect are feelings which should accompany our duty-based action.

I shall make a classically inspired distinction between raw and trained emotions from a cognitivist viewpoint, which assumes a close relation between emotions and beliefs or some other cognitive states (doxastic or even perceptual or non-propositional. [De Sousa (1987)])[24] Cognitive states are necessary but not sufficient for emotions.[25] Therefore emotions have cognitive features and tell us something about values and our moral character, so that we can make a distinction between appropriate and inappropriate emotions. They also have other biological, physiological and cultural dimensions, not relevant for the present topic, except for the point that some of these traits make them recalcitrant to rational control because of their passivity.[26]

A cultivated ethical sensitivity needs emotional furniture of some moral trained emotions. *Trained emotions* are emotions indirectly obtained by personal educational projects of construction of practical identity.[27] *Raw emotions* are involuntary (innate or educationally acquired) emotional inclinations, obtained as a result of the natural or social lottery, so dependent entirely on moral luck.

Moral trained emotions (gratefulness, guilt, benevolence, pity, shame, empathy, just indignation…) are a subset of trained emotions that are designed in order to guide us by the beneficence principle, according to the altruistic counterfactual: to act for the benefit of others, even if this action is directly against my interest. They can be acquired by Elsterian indirect strategies, as targets of complex moral training [Elster (1999)].Of course, it would be hyper-rational to conceive of a project of direct emotional control. Nevertheless, emotions can be partially tamed (indirectly through the action and the imagination or the representation of some things related [Descartes (1649)]). This taming of emotion is mandatory in moral education.

Emotions may take a middle place between beliefs and actions. Emotions are not like actions, which are taken to imply responsibility. We are only partially responsible for our emotions, insofar as we must have undertaken some project of shaping our mind to feel them (recall my quote from

Kant's DV 126, where he holds that we have an indirect duty to cultivate good feeling.) Some emotions share with beliefs the fact that they are only indirectly under our control: we cannot choose directly to have a particular belief (*e.g.* that we are good swimmers), but we can manage to learn the correct skills in order to acquire the corresponding state that may cause and justify the belief. Similarly, even if I am predisposed to jealousy as a raw emotion, I am capable of learning that other people are nobody's property and can acquire some other doxastic states about the dangers of counter-wishful thinking, which *inter alia* can help me to obtain a trained moral emotion of generous care for my loved one. Certainly, emotional inertia phenomena make clear that this taming of emotions will be at best only a partial achievement.

By saying that we have a duty to acquire some moral trained emotions I am not simply claiming objectivity for the moral emotions from a cognitivist perspective, but putting forward a different normative claim. If it were not so, then no difference could be drawn between fitting and appropriate emotions [D'Arms and Jacobson (2000)]. Emotions can be fitting or epistemically justified though it may be wrong to feel them. A *fitting emotion* presents its object as having certain evaluative features (to be afraid about something and this thing being fearsome, to be ashamed and the event being shameful…) This relation of epistemic justification can connect non-propositional items, so that the emotion may not be based on a belief that contains an axiological concept, as the cognitive basis may be a non-conceptual perceptual content [Mulligan (1998)]. An *appropriate emotion* may be fitting or not, but it is defined by its moral justification in a given practical context. Think about the following case. If you are a widow with young children, excessive grief would be fitting (as the loss of your beloved spouse or husband is so sad), but it would not be appropriate to indulge in sorrow, in as much as this would make bringing up your children and providing them with the life they deserve even more difficult. It is not that it is better not to express the emotion, but even to feel it, because of the close relationship between feeling an emotion and expressing it or being disturbed in the performance of your duty.

In sum, appropriate moral trained emotions are the best candidates for fulfilling the harmonic agent ideal.

CONCLUSION

A neo-Aristotelian view on the moral worth of some emotions can be accommodated in a mostly Kantian ethical theory, even if Kant's writings tend to neglect the role of emotions (raw emotions) in moral thought. Some fragments in *The Doctrine of virtue* and in *Religion within the limits of reason alone* suggest the possibility of incorporating appropriate moral trained

emotions in a revisionist reading of Kant, which takes from Aristotle's approach the notion of the harmonic emotionally trained agent. This yields a hybrid theory where emotions are morally worthy, insofar as they are not only epistemically good guides of evaluative judgements, but also normative ingredients whose absence (a) fails to offer a sound account of practical reason in a mostly Kantian ethical theory, (b) threatens moral success in personal relation cases and (c) neglects the personal happiness of the harmonic agent, the search for which, contrary to Kant's suggestions and not from utilitarian arguments, can even be considered a duty.

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NOTES

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[1] As, for example, De Sousa (1999) seems to hold.

[2] Later I shall be concerned with the purported arguments showing that the purity of motivation and the autonomy of the moral agent are not threatened by the presence of emotional incentives [*Triebfedern*]. I will not take into account the contrast between *Affekte* and *Leidenschaften*, as nothing turns on these details for my theoretical strategy here. The purpose of the paper allows me also to leave aside ontological and logical questions about emotions: for example, whether or not they determine a natural class. As usual, I shall consider mental states like sadness, envy, pride, fear or shame as emotions.

[3] Sherman's (1990) terms. The kind of realism which I defend is a form of Moorean non-naturalistic approach. According to this moral predicates cannot be analyzed in non-normative terms [Dancy (2001)].

[4] About basic cross-cultural emotions see Ekman (1984).

[5] For historical accuracy see Martínez Marzoa (1989).

[6] Important exceptions are the works by Damasio, De Sousa, Elster, Lyons or Green. See De Sousa (1987) and particularly De Sousa (2003) for an excellent overview.

[7] "No emotion can give an agent a moral interest in action, since it determines the will according to the principle of happiness." [CPrR 92-3, GMM640]

[8] "[…] spirits with so sympathetic a temper that, without any further motive of self-interest, find a pleasure in spreading happiness around them" [GMM 398].

[9] The *hedonic value* of an emotion is the pleasure or the displeasure obtained by its presence and/or the satisfaction of its conative component.

[10] [DV 456]. The 'moral saint' would have this internal unity, as long as he is free of the temptations of immoral desires.

[11] In other cases he suggests the opposite [DV XII, 6, 399].

[12] To grasp the distinction, see *infra* my comments on personal relation cases.

[13] Transmutations of emotions use to be due to unconscious strategies of self-protection. This is the way envy transmutes sometimes into just indignation, as the agent cannot accept the illegitimate emotion and substitutes it for a legitimate one. See Elster (1999).

[14] Both are examples of conflict between sympathy and bad morality. Recall that Huck helps Jim to escape, acting against his 'moral' principles and guided by his sympathy. Himmler asked his SS generals to extinguish their wrong and 'sick' sympathies towards the Jews and follow their 'duty' as decent people.

[15] See Aristotle's distinction between theoretical knowlegde, *sophia*, *versus* practical knowledge, *phronesis*.

[16] If the Aristotelian *addendum* is right, then chosen actions would not be the best indicators of character: moral emotions would accomplish this job.

[15] The use of the intellectual calculation alone gives a sense of infallibility. Instead of that, emotion creates doubt and a sense of uncertainty essential to the deliberative and prudential nature of practical reason. Moreover, Kantian philosophers use to think about wrong action caused by emotional inclinations, but not about the more dangerous excesses of rational malevolence, whose freed from passion makes easy the deliberate calculation of the better conditions for immoral acting. As Berner (2000) has put it, emotional impoverishment increases evil by local anaesthesia. See also Scheler's (1954) remark that the most efficient torturer is the most empathic, as he knows what causes the most pain. Toulmin (1981) prevents on the moral hazards of moral universalism in the bioethical field.

[16] The personal relation case is a difficult one: it seems to threaten the moral universalistic rule as it demands a particular emotional causation.

[17] Kant, somehow against some of his writings, says that we have "no moral duty to have moral feelings, but to cultivate them" [DV XII, 6].

[18] Not that it is a duty to become a moral saint (this would be supererogation), but to try to achieve this ideal as a Kantian regulative model. This seems to be in conflict with Wolf (1982), who points out some regrettable features of moral saints.

[19] On apathy see DV, II. However, see R II, where he clearly denies the Stoic path of avoidance and ask for a prudential training of emotions.

[20] It should be pointed out that Kant takes 'moral feeling' to mean a kind of receptivity for pleasure or displeasure, arose from the awareness either that my action fulfils my duty or that is guided by the self-love principle.

[21] At DV Kant makes a distinction between pathological and practical love. He despises the first as it is out of our control to have the emotion (and 'ought' implies 'can').

[22] As Korsgaard says, Kant sketches in "Conjectural beginnings of human history" a kind of view according to which reason works on the passive inputs and develops cognitively-loaded intelligent human desires from them. Maybe this would roughly amount to the difference between raw and trained emotions.

[23] I think that even a judgmentalist like Solomon would nowadays favour such an approach.

[24] To account for this passivity it is not mandatory to defend a hybrid cognitive theory of emotions, as Nash (1987) has shown. I find very enlightening the suggestion by D'Arms and Jacobson (2000) to compare the inertial aspect of emotions (they called it 'the judgmental dissonance aspect') with the Müller-Lyer illusion: sometimes we can acknowledge that an emotion is groundless, but continue to make the evaluative judgement.

[25] This 'construction' is not a romantic, existentialist illusion, insofar as we recognize an irreductible final fact that cannot be factored into the decision-making. See Blackburn's (1998) skepticisms about Korsgaard's account of practical identity.

[26] It is a further line of research to inquire about the relation between this approach on emotional training and theories about the identity of the self. From Plato to Freud and Fodor, partition theories have always raised the problem about which mental part is the controller (the trainer in this case) and how the decision is made.

[27] On this distinction see D'Arms and Jacobson (2000).

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