Rationality and Evaluative Frameworks

After the publication of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions by Thomas S. Kuhn, we have gradually learnt to endorse the view that universal standards of rationality do not exist, even in science. All the standards of rationality are linked to the rival and incommensurable paradigms. And what applies to science, applies to morality as well: there are no ahistorical, acultural standards which would objectively determine what is good, right, or honourable.

The lack of universal standards seems to render the idea of rational justification of scientific paradigms and of moral precepts impossible. Thus, our options seem to be either moral subjectivism and a relativist "anything goes"-view in science or a conservative defence of whatever views and standards we happen to have at the moment.

In this thesis I will study the views of Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre who claim they have gone beyond these options with a historicist and comparative account of rationality. They both claim that an analogy between rationality in science and in morality should be taken seriously.