Villanueva, Enrique (2000) La mente es una estructura causal: el funcionalismo teorico. Teorema, XIX (1). pp. 27-44.
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Abstract
Causal functionalism of the sort David Lewis advocates is subject to examination and criticism. This brand of functionalism is brought to bear on the ontological question what are psychological properties? Answering that they are causal theoretical properties whose natures will be empirically discovered eventually.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | Causal; Functionalism; Identity; Metaphysics; Psychology; Lewis, D. |
Subjects: | Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Bewußtseinsphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes und der Psychologie Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Teorema. Revista internacional de filosofia > Volume XIX (2000) Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Logik, analytische Philosophie |
Depositing User: | Wolfgang Heuer |
Date Deposited: | 06 Dec 2020 13:53 |
Last Modified: | 06 Dec 2020 13:53 |
URI: | http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/2725 |