La mente es una estructura causal: el funcionalismo teorico

Villanueva, Enrique (2000) La mente es una estructura causal: el funcionalismo teorico. Teorema, XIX (1). pp. 27-44.

[thumbnail of enrique.pdf] PDF
enrique.pdf

Download (227kB)

Abstract

Causal functionalism of the sort David Lewis advocates is subject to examination and criticism. This brand of functionalism is brought to bear on the ontological question what are psychological properties? Answering that they are causal theoretical properties whose natures will be empirically discovered eventually.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Causal; Functionalism; Identity; Metaphysics; Psychology; Lewis, D.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Bewußtseinsphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes und der Psychologie
Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Teorema. Revista internacional de filosofia > Volume XIX (2000)
Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Logik, analytische Philosophie
Depositing User: Wolfgang Heuer
Date Deposited: 06 Dec 2020 13:53
Last Modified: 06 Dec 2020 13:53
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/2725

Actions (login required)

View Item
View Item