Names That Name Nothing

Theories of direct reference maintain that names
contribute their bearers to propositions expressed by
sentences or utterances on occasions of use. On these
theories, names contribute only their bearers and have no
surplus meaning. The sentence "Wittgenstein taught
school in Kirchberg� expresses the proposition identified by
the ordered pair <Wittgenstein, having taught school in
Kirchberg>. Whether theories of direct reference are
correct is a matter of dispute. Kripke"s (1972) arguments
against descriptive theories of the meanings of names
were persuasive, but descriptive theorists have
persuasively fought back (Stanley, 1997). In this paper, I
will not attempt to settle the larger dispute between the two
opposing camps, but will focus on the matter of what a
direct reference theorist ought to say about names that
lack bearers. In order even to be a contender in the larger
dispute between referentialists and descriptivists, theories
of direct reference must have a plausible story to tell about
the use of names that name nothing in utterances and
sentences both positive and negative.