Gunnarsson, Logi (2002) What Is Constituted in Self-Constitution? In: UNSPECIFIED Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, pp. 76-78.
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Abstract
A subject who has a self-transformation behind
herself—say, a conversion to Catholicism—may say of
herself "before transforming myself, I was a different
person�. How are we to understand such a claim?
Obviously, there is a sense in which the subject takes
herself to be the same as before and another sense in
which she considers herself to be somebody else now.
One possible way of understanding it would be the
following: Despite the change involved in the selftransformation,
there is enough similiarity between the preconversion
subject—S1—and the converted subject—
S2—to say that they are numerically identical. And there is
enough difference for the subject to speak of herself before
the self-transformation as another person.
Item Type: | Book Section |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | personal identity; self-transformation; Korsgaard Ch. M. |
Subjects: | Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Bewußtseinsphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes und der Psychologie Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Sprachphilosophie Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2002 |
Depositing User: | Wolfgang Heuer |
Date Deposited: | 06 Dec 2020 14:15 |
Last Modified: | 06 Dec 2020 14:15 |
URI: | http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/2869 |