Kpalap, Linus T. (2002) Lonergan on Person as Psychological Subject. In: UNSPECIFIED Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, pp. 121-123.
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Abstract
The turn to the subject, heralded by Kant as the
transcendental turn has influenced subsequent modes of
philosophizing. For Hegel, this turn has meant a shift from
substance to subject. A shift from talk about substance or
soul to talk about subject has brought about a new
perspective in the approach to thinking about person. So
instead of speaking about a soul, its acts and its objects,
we speak about a subject and its conscious acts.
Item Type: | Book Section |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | Person; Psychological Subject; Lonergan B. |
Subjects: | Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Bewußtseinsphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes und der Psychologie Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2002 |
Depositing User: | Wolfgang Heuer |
Date Deposited: | 06 Dec 2020 14:20 |
Last Modified: | 06 Dec 2020 14:20 |
URI: | http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/2899 |