Kügler, Peter (2002) A Dilemma for Personal Identity. In: UNSPECIFIED Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, pp. 124-126.
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Abstract
Some theories of personal identity allow persons
to lose their identities in processes of qualitative change,
i.e., to become a numerically different person by getting
new physical and/or psychological properties. I shall call
these theories strong. Weak theories, in contrast, do not
allow for such a loss of identity. In general, weak theories
put less restrictions on personal identity than strong ones. I
will argue that each type of theory faces a serious problem.
Item Type: | Book Section |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | person-theories, strong theory, weak theory; Memory; Intention; Persistence; Causality |
Subjects: | Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Bewußtseinsphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes und der Psychologie Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2002 |
Depositing User: | Wolfgang Heuer |
Date Deposited: | 06 Dec 2020 14:20 |
Last Modified: | 06 Dec 2020 14:20 |
URI: | http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/2900 |