Foundationalism and Coherentism From a Contextualist Point of View

Blome-Tillmann, Michael (2003) Foundationalism and Coherentism From a Contextualist Point of View. In: UNSPECIFIED Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, pp. 42-43.

[thumbnail of blome.pdf] PDF
blome.pdf

Download (142kB)

Abstract

Here is the picture classical foundationalism draws of
empirical justification: Our system of beliefs is structured
like a pyramid, it consists of a broad foundation of perceptual
beliefs, i.e. beliefs reporting the contents of our
perceptual states, and a superstructure of worldly beliefs,
i.e. beliefs reporting what is going on in the world around
us. The beliefs building the foundation, the perceptual
beliefs, are to be justified noninferentially, by direct appeal
to our perceptual experiences, while the beliefs in the
superstructure, beliefs about what is going on in the world
around us, are to be justified inferentially, i.e. by appeal to
other beliefs. Ultimately, our worldly beliefs thus rest on
our perceptual beliefs, which in turn draw upon our
perceptual experiences.

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: Foundationalism; Coherentism; Contextualism; Davidson, D.; McDowell, J.; Rorty, R.; Sellars, W.
Subjects: Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Bewußtseinsphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes und der Psychologie
Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2003
Depositing User: Wolfgang Heuer
Date Deposited: 06 Dec 2020 14:34
Last Modified: 06 Dec 2020 14:34
URI: http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/2985

Actions (login required)

View Item
View Item