Wittgenstein on Knowledge (1949-1951)

In this paper, I want to characterize Wittgenstein"s epistemology,
namely his contextualism, presented in his notes
published under the title On Certainty. This characterization
will be made in terms of a comparison with four control
points in order to put into light the peculiarities of Wittgenstein"s
epistemological position. The markers I will use for
that purpose will give an indication of the level of conceptual
commitment toward four important epistemological
theses: holism, internalism, fallibilism, and egalitarianism.
These markers have been chosen in function of the power
of discrimination they provide regarding the two main
trends in the past 40 years (or so) of debate in contemporary
epistemology, i.e., foundationalism and coherentism.
Using these conceptual markers, one can easily distinguish
between strict foundationalism, which shows a low
level of each markers, and strict coherentism, which shows
a high level of each markers.