Non-epistemic Values and Scientific Knowledge

In Science, Truth, and Democracy Philip Kitcher presents
arguments to the effect that scientific inquiry is valuedependent
in so far as "scientific significance" is crucial to
understanding the scientific enterprise and is analysable
only in terms of human interests. He proposes a marriage
between value dependence and moderate scientific
realism, challenging thus a long-standing tradition of
radically separating non-epistemic values and scientific
knowledge. In my paper I want to make the rationale of
that marriage more comprehensible and interpret it as a
step towards a naturalized philosophy of science. In my
first section I will make clear what I understand as "naturalizing"
and what I take to be the substantial problem, i.e.
the steering function of non-epistemic values in cognitive
processes. The second section will identify the assumptions
on which the separation of non-epistemic values and
knowledge are based. In the third section Kitcher's arguments
in favour of a marriage will be presented and
evaluated. Finally, I will sketch a positive account how nonepistemic
values steer cognitive processes.