Intersubjektivitet, Moral og Menneskerettigheter, En Eksistensialistik og Diskursetisk Tilnærming

Intersubjectivity, moral, and human rights – an existentialistic and discourse ethical
approach
This paper examines the phenomena of intersubjectivity, moral and human rights and reviews
these topics on three levels of analysis: one ontological, one moral and one moral-practical
level. These matters are approached in an existentialistic and discourse ethical manner in
which Jean-Paul Sartre and Jürgen Habermas are exponents of these philosophical movements.
Sartre"s theory of intersubjectivity is founded in a phenomenological ontology in which the
self-conscious individual "is condemned to be free� and in which this individual confronts a
contingent world of inanimate things whose meaning entirely depends upon what he freely
chooses. Each consciousness is fundamentally self-constituting, but stands opposed to nature,
history, and other consciousnesses, and is defining and redefining itself, others and the world
by choosing his future. The human consciousness is then completely responsible for what it
makes of itself. The original meaning of the other and the social world for Sartre is conflict
which is revealed in the experience of "the look� in and through which the self is initially
constituted, experiencing itself as an object for others. But this paper suggests that the
intersubjectivity revealed in the experience of the "the look� has normative implications in
which the ontological concept of freedom is connected to a moral concept of responsibility.
Habermas theory of intersubjectivity is communicative based, and presupposes a community
of investigators who endeavour to perform their common task communicatively in which the
linguistic domain is the only place where the validity claims of speech acts can be clarified. A
presupposition of this discursive validation is that the condition for the truth of statements is
the potential agreement of everyone else. Then, by way of argumentation and a rational
consensus, to which all speakers have equal access and in which only the "force of the better
argument prevails� the communicative community can reach a mutual recognition and
normative self-legislation. This communicative theory lays the foundation for the discourse
ethics which presupposes that normative validity claims have a cognitive meaning and that the
grounding and validity of all norms is tied to an actually discursive opinion- and willformation
and in the last instance is not possible monologically. Here Habermas converts his
discourse ethics into democratic theory and institutionalizes the rational discourse through a
system of rights and law-making. This represents a tension between facticity and validity and
is exemplified by the question of how to transform communicative power into administrative
power. Foremost Habermas suggest that only through open public argument and discourse,
complex societies can engage in moral and political decision-making. Moral and political
decision-making can only be validated through open and intersubjective argumentation where
only those norms which can meet with the approval of all affected parts, can claim legitimacy.
Politics must therefore be understood as a process of collective opinion- and will-formation,
characterized by reasoned dialogue and of self-legislation according to which the addressees
of law are simultaneously the authors of their rights - and not the simple aggregation of
subjective preferences through voting. This opinion- and will-formation is most importantly
diverted through the public sphere. Here Sartre contributes with his idea that political
engagement is an ontologically grounded moral imperative. This paper then suggests a
concept of an engaged, public sphere.