Moore"s Proof of an External World. Just Begging the Question

The aim of this paper is to assess Moore"s Proof of an
external world, in light of recent interpretations of it, namely
Crispin Wright"s (1985) and James Pryor"s (unpublished).
In the first section I will present Moore"s original proof
and claim that, despite Moore"s intentions, it can be read
as an anti-sceptical proof. In the following two sections I
will present Wright"s and Pryor"s interpretations of it.
Finally, I will claim that if we grant some of Pryor"s intuitions,
it is true that the proof does not exhibit what Wright
calls "transmission-failure� and Pryor misleadingly presents
as a case of question-begging argument. I will then offer
my own interpretation of what a question-begging argument
is. On that basis, I will claim that, contrary to what
Pryor maintains, Moore"s proof is not just wanting because
of a generic dialectical shortcoming, but because it begs
the question after all.