Connections and Divisions in On Certainty

The central claim of this paper is that On Certainty (1969)
is not to be seen as a "work� of Wittgenstein, but as an
assemblage from the enormous collection of material that
constitutes the Nachlass (cf. Stern 1996; Ackermann 1998;
Hintikka 1991). To substantiate this assertion, I will
critically compare the publication to its sources, namely
manuscripts 172, 174, 175, 176 and 177 of the Nachlass. I
will trace and value the decisions G.E.M. Anscombe and
G.H. von Wright have made in gathering this collection.
Their claim is twofold: first, Wittgenstein "marked it [On
Certainty] off in his notebooks as a separate topic�, and
second "it constitutes a single sustained treatment of the
topic� (Wittgenstein 1969, Preface). I will show that the first
claim is incorrect: not only are Wittgenstein"s "marks�
ambiguous, but the editors applied their own demarcations
in these notebooks as well. Their second claim is in need
of amplification. Wittgenstein"s concern with epistemological
issues is not limited to these five manuscripts: other
notebooks of the same period also contain entries that
strongly relate to topics discussed in On Certainty. I will
discuss examples from the undated notebooks MSS 169,
170 and 171, published in Last Writings on the Philosophy
of Psychology, Vol. II: The "Inner� and the "Outer� (1992).
These show that it is difficult to make strict divisions in the
Nachlass in general, and in the late writings of the years
1949-1951 in particular.