Internalism externalized. Doxastic Change, the Body, and Causation

One important element of a reliabilist account of knowledge
is the causal production of beliefs about the external
world. If such beliefs are thus produced they are likely to
be true. This is a strategy that is not available to internalism.
A strong link to Humean accounts of causation may
be implicit in internalist doctrines about justification since
they seem to assume the impossibility of justified beliefs
about genuine causal facts. But if it can be shown that
beliefs about causal facts are justifiable in the internalist
sense then this would decisively modify the unsatisfying
position of internalism regarding knowledge about the
external world. It will be argued that knowledge presupposes
doxastic change and that (i) beliefs about doxastic
change are indefeasibly justifiable, that (ii) such change is
not itself a doxastic entity, and (iii) that it involves causal
facts.