Shieber, Joseph (2003) What our Rylean Ancestors Knew: More on Knowing How and Knowing That. In: Pre-Proceedings of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Kirchberg am Wechsel, pp. 328-330.
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Abstract
In their recent article "Knowing How,�1 Jason Stanley and
Timothy Williamson deny that there is a fundamental
distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that,
claiming instead that knowledge-how is rather a form of
knowledge-that. I contend that Stanley and Williamson are
incorrect in rejecting the distinction between knowledgehow
and knowledge-that. Our Rylean ancestors, and Ryle
himself, had a genuine insight in recognizing knowing-how
and knowing-that as distinct phenomena. This discussion
will be divided into two sections. In section 1, I discuss
some implications of what I take to be our naïve notion of
knowing-that. In section 2, I turn to a defense of Ryle"s
argument in favor of the distinction between knowledgehow
and knowledge-that against the criticisms leveled
against it by Stanley and Williamson.
Item Type: | Book Section |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | Knowhing How; Knowing That;Ryle, G.; |
Subjects: | Philosophie > Philosophische Journale, Kongresse, Vereinigungen > Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg, Pre-Proceedings > Kirchberg 2003 Philosophie > Philosophische Disziplinen > Logik, analytische Philosophie |
Depositing User: | Wolfgang Heuer |
Date Deposited: | 06 Dec 2020 15:02 |
Last Modified: | 06 Dec 2020 15:02 |
URI: | http://sammelpunkt.philo.at/id/eprint/3173 |