La investigación kantiana sobre el espacio y el tiempo

The article begins by presenting what we consider to be the two basic assumptions of Kantian study. One of these is the opacity of existing substances; this requires a clarification of Kant’s definition of “intuition”. The Metaphysical Exposition of the notions of space and time is shown as a critique of Locke’s findings — following what we call his “clear and distinct ideas” method — in his research on these two concepts. In this part we look at Berkeley’s critique of abstract ideas, which overturns the Lockean method, and Kant’s way of resolving the conflict through his gnoseological concept of “pure intuition”. In the second part we discuss the character of intuition that Kant attributes to the concepts of space and time, and its role in explaining mathematical judgements as synthetic and a priori. The third part addresses the need –– which results from considering Newton’s mechanics as true–– of acknowledging the existence of absolute space and time. In this case, the polemics develops between the so-called mathematicians and Leibniz. The Kantian solution to this perplexity is his doctrine of the ideality of space and time.