R. Haller is
right in pointing out that an ,,universalism essentially determined by
tradition''
linked the two separate and mutually hostile departments under Leo
Gabriel's and Erich Heintel's direction more or less behind their back.
Protecting the time-honored procedures of academic philosophy against intrusion
by scientific influences was among the basic strategies on both sides of the
corridor whose connecting door was firmly kept shut. The recurring pattern was
simple and easily remembered. Modern science is undoubtedly peerless in its
efficiency but it has gone wrong in reaching out into domains it is not
equipped to master and which by right belong to the area of competence of
professional reflexion on the provenience and fundaments of Man and World. The
newly proposed methodological abstractions are to be called into question in
such a process and it was held to be absurd to claim that a set of logical
tools is adequate for this task of evaluating its own effects. ,,Fundamental
philosophy'' was felt to be necessary to inquire into the
foundations of such an
uncritical methodological monism. Its establishment provides a clear line of
demarcation which E.Heintel was quick to exploit by applying the term
,,neopositivism'' to a puzzling collection of philosophical methods.
,,Under the
name of ,neopositivism' I subsume (i) ,logical empiricism' influenced by
Principia Mathematica and issued from the ,Vienna Circle', (ii) ,language
analysis'
particularly widespread in Anglsaxon countries and (iii) philosophy
of science insofar as it advances
philosophical claims.''
As a consequence of
this exotic terminology former students of Heintel up to this day use
,,positivism'' as a term of abuse for such diverse thinkers as early and late
Wittgenstein, W.v.O.Quine, N.Goodman or H.Putnam.
,, ,Separation' of neopositivism
from metaphysics, fundamental philosophy and therefore from philosophy in
general is to be welcomed as a positive achievement because it effectuates a
distinction of different levels of meaning. But there will not be lasting peace
as long as the discussion concerning this delimitation is not itself led in the
spirit of fundamental philosophy.''
The quote exhibits some of the more advanced
features of the strategy used against the trespasses of modern science into the
realm of established philosophy. In a first move recourse is taken to the
insight that different levels of meaning demand different methods of
disclosure. Fair enough, but in the same breath ,,neopositivism'' is with one
stroke of the pen excluded from philosophy.This straightforward manouvre needs
some meta-methodological back-up though. Excluding different approaches from
the field of legitimate discussion obviously is an activity which has to be
subjected to criteria of validity itself. Now it is fairly obvious that such
criteria can only be counted on to yield the ,,right''
results if they are biased
in favor of the desired outcome and this is precisely what Heintel openly
admits. As long as those excluded by his idiosyncratic terminology do not
acknowledge that justice has been done to them no peace will be achieved. I am
aware of the fact that the last two decades have taught us that there is
something called ,,theory-dependent observation'' and that we would
never arrive
at any cognitive conclusions if our arguments were not invested with
prejudices. Nevertheless it still is essential to distinguish between the
inescapable use of presuppositions in an open dialogue and straightforward
statements like Heintel's, arrogating for fundamental philosophy the role of
ultimate arbiter and custodian of some threatened order.
It would, however, be
precipitate to overlook that Heintel's strategy carried some conviction because
it very effectively managed to combine two motives (one methodological, the
other with regard to content): reflexivity and awareness of the historical
dimension. This has to be developed next. The strategy outlined above is
designed to counter the confusion of different ,,levels of meaning''
threatening
when scientific pretension goes unchecked. Motives from the Enlightenment as
well as from Romanticism are combined to reveal two basic flaws in
,,neopositivism'': its lack of methodological
self-awareness and its contemptive
ignorance of the historical dimensions of philosophical thought. Turning the
argument concerning traditional philosophy's obsoleteness around Heintel
proposes that philosophia perennis has in fact
long ago surpassed the stage
of ,,pre-critical dogmatism'' this ,,modern
nominalism''
is reenacting. By this
appeal to hermeneutically enlightened critical reflection a very efficient
systematical device is forged, simultaneously performing two separate tasks:
opening up previously unattended possibilities behind any given position and
immediately specifying them as already familiar from one's acquaintance with
traditional thought. By means of this strategic move the custodians of the
classical heritage turn out to be at the same time experts in methodological
reflection. As illustration of the general idea take Heintel's treatment of
Wittgenstein's famous proposition 7 from the ,,Tractatus''. He diagnoses a
,,yearning after the unutterable'' transcending positivistical restrictions and
patronizingly states that ,,it is Wittgenstein's tragedy that the routes to a
speculative and universal critique of language remained closed to
him.''
Disregarding the universalistic tinge of this remark for the moment it
doubtlessly expresses a metaphilosophical sentiment many non-analytic
philosophers and laymen share with regard to Wittgenstein's dramatic
denouement. In offering to transform more or less stubborn silence into the
eloquence of an elaborate hierarchy of distinctions structuring the realm of
meaning Heintel certainly answered a widespread need.
A somewhat loftier version
of the same promise was employed by L. Gabriel whose Integrale
Logik has
nothing whatever to do with modern achievements in the discipline, completely
lacking any understanding of its symbolism and procedures. Gabriel's crucial
move again consists in a global rejection of analytical approaches which he
criticizes as ,,merely negative abstractions of logical
form'', devoid of the
all-encompassing synthetic power his Gestalt-logic is supposed to supply. A
comprehensive mapping out of structurally ordered dimensions of meaning issuing
in an holistic panorama of human existence and history as such is regarded as
the only worthwhile philosophical project. R. Haller is certainly right in
calling this an ,,absolute Austrian compromise in the realm of
thinking'' but it
would once more be short-sighted to overlook the intuitive appeal such attempts
at explaining the universe exerted (and still exert). Shrugging them off as
woolly talk would be self-defeating. Holism is a key factor of this
anti-analytical rhetoric. Heintel's ,,most general definition'' of the
transcendental point of view consists in stating ,,that there is nothing which
is not simultaneously mediated and unmediated'' whereas for Gabriel philosophy's
subject matter is ,,the world as a whole''. Amidst such globalistic talk it is
conveniently forgotten (by friends and foes alike) that it arises out of a
particular social context itself. It addresses itself to some previous
experience in order to carry conviction. This leads me to consider Viennese
traditionalism of the sixties as a final blooming of an opposition triggered by
the Viennese Circle itself. Even if it was no longer in evidence the antibodies
produced by this virus were a testimony to its latent effectiveness.