There is little doubt that the anti-metaphysical pronouncements emanating
from the spokesmen of the Vienna Circle were highly provocative and called for
a response on part of those who where in the business of practising such
presumably outmoded and intellectually discredited methods.In the interest of
free Socratic discourse it would have been desirable had this been possible
within a democratic setting devoid of outside interference and socio-political
emotions, something like the ,,ideal speech-situation'' Habermas envisages.
Obviously things were much more confused than that, none of the academics
involved being able to distance himself entirely from the political
implications of his professional convictions. Some members of the Circle were
effectivly attacking the existing order of Austrian society and all of them
actively promoted science as an ultimately progressive force at the expense of
the established humanistic curriculum. It is not very suprising that what is
nowadays being rediscovered as revolutionary impetus
was then perceived as
dangerous undertaking. Nor should we censure any representative of the status
quo at that time for expressing such an opinion. Under idealized circumstances
this would have led to violent academic clashes focussing on the issues raised
by the logical empiricists. Academia being what it is already established
professors presumably would not have been flexible enough to respond to the
challenge in any adequate way but their most gifted and curious students,
aspiring to become the next generation of traditionally minded scholars, would
have had to address this task unless they wanted to lose all of their
credibility. It is by no means a foregone conclusion how the Vienna Circle
which politically speaking was split between Neurath's leftism and Schlick's
more conservative approach would have reacted to serious attempts at defining
traditional philosophy.
All of this of course is mere hypothetical construction
since the political events brought about by Austro-fascism and the subsequent
Anschluß completely blocked any
civilized argument concerning these matters.
But it draws attention to the fact that L.Gabriel and E.Heintel being students
of philosophy under supervision by scholastic and Kantian philosophers at this
very time must have been deeply affected by the ongoing events. They can be
seen as the designated apologists of their teacher's convictions, intent to
build their own career on defending their cause. We know that things took a
different turn and instead of becoming the battling ground between
controversial approaches to science and cultural tradition the university of
Vienna was gleichgeschaltet (brought into line) with the rest of the
universities of the Third Reich. The traditionalists doubtlessly were closer to
the new regime than their opponents but in order to understand later
developments it is extremely important to stress the differences between
(predominantly Christian) conservatism and fascism in academic circles and in
the society at large. While they were certainly sharing Bolschewism and Social
Democracy as common enemies the Church and traditionalistic circles (or at
least some of their more enlightened representatives) kept a certain distance
to Hitler who for his part regarded them with suspicion. Resistance to Nazism
from the conservative side was at least prominent enough to save its image
among the forces partly discredited after the breakdown of the Reich. Fear of
Stalinism and the need for a stable value-system during the period of
reconstruction were additional factors accounting for Austria's post-war
political development which until the mid-sixties was characterized by an
extensive cooperation between most of the social forces under the direction of
the conservative Peoples Party. It is against this background that the story of
the suspended debate initiated by the Vienna Circle has to be continued.
Both the local resources and the geo-political pattern are of importance here. By a dramatic shift of fortunes logical empiricism turned out to be extremely successful in Anglo-American universities. At the same time the allies, having saved central European democracies from their own inherent fascism, were exerting their heavy influence as liberators as well as occupying forces. For Austrians forced to adapt their identity to the disasters of civil and world wars this meant to be confronted with what looked like shattered pieces of the European tradition but even more importantly with the overwhelming presence of a new cultural hegemony. Gratitude and friendship towards the United States were the categories used to cover up a distinctly ambivalent attitude: feeling uncomfortably dependent on the forces of the new order and persevering with attempts to carry on one's own way of life. Philosophy offered itself as a particularly helpful instrument of self-assurance. Buildings and social structures might have been destroyed but philosophia perennis, a witness to the irreplaceable contribution of German thinking to civilization, was not nor could it have been demolished. National independence did not affect this intellectual situation shared by Germany and Austria alike, so philosophically speaking the Anschluß was never really revoked in the aftermath of Hitler's defeat. Exposed to the influence of a friendly but ,,barbarian'' power intellectuals in both countries alike were driven towards self-searching and the foundation they hit upon predictably turned out to be the cultural heritage of Europe rather than science and technology rapidly advancing in the United States. The outcome of all of this was that the offspring of the Vienna Circle dominated Anglo-American thinking whereas back in Vienna an urgent need for philosophy to help resist the friendly embrace of the allies was arising. Guardians of the tradition suddenly were in great demand. Having had contact with logical empiricism proved to be an ideal precondition for the task they were expected to fulfill, namely to demonstrate to their generation that even in spite of the fact that the allies had taken over some of ,,our own'' philosophical talents our philosophical potential was still vastly superior to theirs. Instead of the work of mourning and of catching up one started to rehearse philosophia perennis as a token of European cultural vocation. In picking on the Vienna Circle the professors could continue in the vein of their graduate student's years while at the same time - without openly turning against the Anglo-American occupiers - proceed to establish themselves as heirs to an indestructible kingdom of thought beyond the reach of secular influences.
Situating the traditionalistic strategy described in the previous
section within the upheavals inflicted upon Europe by fascism serves to
understand the generally defensive attitude apparent in the examples given
above. But there is another aspect as well. One has to remind oneself of the
fact that at the time traditionalism took hold in Vienna the place was a
philosophical habitat that had been cleared from its ,,natural enemy'', logical
positivism. What is more: by a remarkable switch in perspective this source of
the attacks on metaphysics was now perceived as a stand-in for all the dangers
threatening from abroad. So after having taken advantage of the lack of
competition that was one of the givens of the moment the traditionalists were
careful not to allow any later intrusion into their domain. Belatedly
responding to the challenge of a group of scientists and thinkers that had been
forced to emigrate they encouraged a situation in which they were free to
develop their all-encompassing hermeneutico-systematic designs without actually
dealing with what had become of their opposition.
Arrogance, opportunism,
increasing professional carelessness and continual infighting were the results
of this strangely narrow-minded holism. Whereas Heidegger's ontology and the
Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School were at least attempts to come to terms
with the profound displacement suffered by traditional thinkers the Viennese
professors did not show themselves disturbed at all, proclaiming their
neo-thomistic or neo-hegelian doctrines as remedies against the general
existential malaise.