Global Justice: Problems of a Cosmopolitan Account

In this paper I take a closer look at the controversy between cosmopolitans and the advocates of a political conception of justice. I will defend a political conception of justice, though I suggest some revisions. A cosmopolitan approach is often connected with monism, i.e., the claim that the same sort of normative principles should apply to institutions and to individual choices. A political conception of justice presupposes dualism, namely a separation between the principles of justice guiding the design of institutions and the moral principles applying to
individual  choices.  In  section  2  of  the  paper  I discuss  Thomas  Pogge’s  cosmopolitan  position  and try to show that Pogge shifts from a dualistic account of justice to a monistic account when it comes to the  problem  of  world  poverty;;  therefore  Pogge’s  treatment  of  world  poverty  is vulnerable to the objections which he himself raised against monism. Moreover, in section 3,  I argue  that  Pogge’s  exclusive  focus  on negative duties is  implausible  and  creates  excessively heavy burdens on the side of better-off individuals. In section 4 I argue that there is no need to consider the nation-state as a hindrance to the realization of a more global justice. I end with some suggestions as to how a political conception of justice can be modified to meet some of the criticisms cosmopolitans have rightly raised.