No Evaluative Authority Is beyond Evaluation: Common Ground between Hegel and Wittgenstein

Correlations between Hegel and Wittgenstein are not easily established. This chapter starts with an attempt to define some common ground. Both Hegel and Wittgenstein often approach philosophical problems not head on, but by discussing (and criticising) established cognitive attitudes. I take their responses to the popular understanding of measurement as a case in point. Hegel’s treatment of “a measure” is shown to deviate from an ordinary understanding of the term insofar as it provides a criterion which is itself sensitive to the object of measurement. A similar point can be observed in Wittgenstein’s work: for example, his memorable remark that one might use a table in order to check the measuring rod rather than the other way around. Triangulating Hegel and Wittgenstein vis-à-vis a non-partisan account of measurement reveals an interesting common concern, namely a shared alertness to a concealed side of standards. It is against this background affinity that some of the differences between them appear in sharper contrast.